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ABSTRACT 
 
Runners Left on Base:  
Cuban Baseball Defection Experience and a Reevaluation of Baseball Diplomacy 
 
by 
 
Marcus F. Cuéllar 
 
Due to laws and restrictions in place in Cuba, baseball athletes born there—including 
many who are considered to be some of the most talented in the world—are not legally 
permitted leave the country to play for Major League Baseball (MLB) teams.  Consequently, 
a phenomenon of baseball athletes defecting from Cuba to play in MLB emerged in 1991 
and has since resulted in more than 250 Cuban ballplayers illegally emigrating from Cuba to 
play professionally in the United States.  Even still, our understanding of their migration 
experiences, as well as those of their families remains incomplete.  By using a lens of 
transnationalism, this study attempts to provide a more complete portrayal of these 
experiences.  A baseball defection case study based on an original semi-structured interview 
is also presented to demonstrate the kinds of questions that have not been sufficiently asked 
regarding these experiences.  Lastly, as a means of eliminating the circumstances that create 
and maintain the demand for baseball defections, an historical examination of “baseball 
diplomacy” is presented to scrutinize its potential for helping to renew US-Cuban relations 
in the current socio-political environment.  
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Introduction 
On a cool August night in Oakland, California, the Oakland A’s trailed the Houston 
Astros by three runs in the bottom of the eighth inning.  However, with a runner on base, the 
crowd in attendance suddenly comes to life, dancing and cheering, as reggaetón music begins to 
blare throughout the stadium and Yoenis Céspedes strides up to home plate.  Already in this 
contest, Céspedes has exhibited his ability to impact the game, having hit a single and a double 
in his first two at-bats.  His reputation as home run hitter was solidified on a national stage the 
month prior when he was crowned champion of MLB’s Home Run Derby.  After watching the 
first two pitches go by, Céspedes smashes a belt-high fastball over the left-field wall.  As he jogs 
around the bases, the crowd continues to celebrate in the kind of euphoria only sport can incite.  
Looking up to a group of fans donning head-to-toe Oakland A’s regalia and seated only a 
handful of rows behind his team’s dugout, Céspedes waves both hands to his family just before 
his teammates crowd around to congratulate him.   
Céspedes’ journey to that stage is unlike any of those who took the field with or against 
him that night because, as a Cuban baseball defector, he had to illegally emigrate from his home 
country to play in MLB.  In fact, the only ones who may have been able to relate to his 
experience that night was the group of his family members in attendance who had to similarly 
endure their own illegal migrations to reach the United States.  Despite the fame that Céspedes 
and many other baseball defectors have acquired over the past two decades, our understanding 
of their experiences, as well as that of their families, remains incomplete and warrants closer 
examination. 
The United States has maintained a commercial, economic, and financial embargo 
against Cuba since October 1960.  With the adoption of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, the 
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United States has declared its intention to maintain this embargo claiming concerns regarding 
human rights abuses and suppression of democratic freedoms on the island. Notwithstanding 
these long-existing tensions between the two nations, one commonality that has remained 
throughout the years in each country has been a passion for baseball.  However, due to laws 
and restrictions in place in Cuba, baseball athletes born there—including many who are 
considered to be some of the most talented in the world—are not legally permitted to leave 
the country to play for Major League Baseball (MLB) teams where they would compete at 
the highest level the sport has to offer and be able to earn substantial salaries.  Consequently, 
a phenomenon of baseball athletes defecting from Cuba to play in MLB emerged in 1991 
when pitcher René Arocha separated from the Cuban national team while at Miami 
International Airport (Wulf 1993).  Since Arocha’s defection, more than 250 Cuban 
ballplayers have illegally emigrated from Cuba to play professionally in the United States 
and it appears that neither their numbers, nor the media attention they garner will decrease 
anytime soon. 
It is widely known that illegally migrating from Cuba in the manner that these 
ballplayers must undertake abounds with both legal and physical peril.  However, most 
accounts provided in the media depict “rags to riches” journeys that involve passage from 
Cuba to the United States on makeshift rafts, but always conclude with a ballplayer fulfilling 
his dream of playing in MLB and living happily ever after.  While these upbeat tales make 
for enjoyable reads, they leave us with an incomplete understanding.  Instead, the reality of 
the Cuban baseball defection experiences is much more complicated and extends far beyond 
the moment that these players arrive in an MLB ballpark. 
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In addition to our lack of understanding of Cuban baseball defection experiences for 
the ballplayers, even less is known about the experiences of their families.  Since the start of 
this ballplayer migration phenomenon nearly 25 years ago, the perspective of the athletes’ 
families, including those who travel with them and those who remain behind in Cuba, has 
been almost entirely overlooked. 
Chapter One seeks to examine assumptions regarding baseball defection experiences 
for athletes and their families and provide a nuanced understanding of them by viewing 
them through the lens of transnationalism.  By utilizing information from an original 
interview conducted with a baseball defector, Chapter Two highlights the lines of inquiry in 
these experiences that have yet to be sufficiently examined and provides insight regarding 
the current state of baseball defection. 
The need for Cuban baseball players to take the extreme action of illegally 
emigrating from their home country in order to pursue a dream of playing baseball for an 
MLB team is triggered by the strained diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba.  
Chapter Three proposes that the two nations may be able to find a starting point for renewed 
bilateral relations through the use of “baseball diplomacy.”  Starting with an historical 
examination of the attempted utilizations of baseball diplomacy over the past 43 years, the 
examination then compares it with the successful application of “Ping-Pong diplomacy” in 
1971.  In the end, an argument for the viability of baseball diplomacy as a means to renew 
US-Cuban relations is made given the current socio-political environment. 
The main goal of this research project is to use baseball, a widely popular sport, to 
identify and highlight any injustices that may be present, not just within baseball defection 
experiences, but in US-Cuban relations in general, and offer a means to resolve them.  
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Indeed, if a privileged class such as high-profile baseball athletes is subject to mistreatment, 
then the implications for non-athlete migrants are likely to be much worse.  As such, the 
onus is on all parties complicit in creating and maintaining the circumstances that lead to these 
injustices, whether they be nations, institutions, or individual researchers and journalists, to 
work towards their termination. 
Theoretical Framework and Relevant Literature 
To examine contemporary Cuban baseball defection experiences as they pertain to 
athletes and their families, this study drew from various theoretical approaches.  Although 
few sources have focused specifically on baseball defection experiences, the literature on 
sport and labor migration is more robust.  Consequently, the theoretical discourses within 
these works became the starting point for this research project.  Found among them were 
examples of the diverse approaches that have been taken to examine sport and labor 
migration, ranging from macro-scale migration, world systems, and development theories, to 
more localized ones like those seen in ethnographic studies grounded in transnationalism.  
At a basic level, every baseball defector’s move from Cuba to the United States is a 
form of labor migration.  This is true in the sense that these migrations are manifest only 
through the professionalization of sport, including baseball, which has been “bound up in a 
sports industrial complex” (Maguire and Falcous 2010, 5).  Anthropologist Thomas F. 
Carter refers to this sports industrial complex as NEOsport (New Economic Order sport) and 
defines it as the “intertwining of neoliberal capitalist regimes” into sport (Carter 2011a, 72).  
Given that professional sport produces only a form of “immaterial labour”—that is to say, 
“services that produce no material or durable goods”— it would not exist without NEOsport 
and its “processes of commercialization, corporatization and spectacularization” that are 
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ultimately motivated by profit (Carter 2011a, 98-99).  As such, it is only through NEOsport 
that athletes are provided the means to capitalize themselves and thus undertake sport 
migration (Carter 2011a, 98). 
Over the past 25 years, the majority of sport migration studies have been framed 
through macro-scale theories, such as world systems theory (i.e. globalization) and 
development theory (Carter 2011a, 11).  However, as one examines works based on these 
theories, it becomes clear that these frameworks fail to consider the individuals who act in 
these migrations.  Instead, attention is paid primarily to structures and institutions, and 
therefore provides us with perspectives that come only from corporate entities, media, and 
governing bodies (Carter 2011a, 67).  By focusing on macro-scale models, individual 
experiences are effectively expunged, leaving us with discussions regarding migration that 
are pre-determined by global structures and do not attribute agency or choice to the migrants 
who take part in it (Carter 2011a, 7; Carter 2011b, 78).  To illustrate this point, Carter cites 
the foundational global sport works of Toby Miller et al. in Globalization and Sport (2001) 
and Joseph Maguire in Global Sport (1999).  However, Yoshio Takahashi and John Horne’s 
“Moving with the Bat and Ball” (2006) and Joseph K. Adjaye’s “Reimagining Sports” 
(2010) demonstrate the continued emphasis placed on structural factors over individual 
experience. 
Likewise, sport migration studies centered on macro-scale theories have had a 
tendency to understate the role of the localities through which migrants pass during their 
journeys (Carter 2011b, 67), regarding athletes as a “freely moving cosmopolitan 
population” (Carter 2011a, 5).  While sport migrants typically do experience increased 
mobility and the circumvention of local law is not uncommon, they nevertheless must still 
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interact and contend with various governments and laws that may “facilitate, inhibit, or 
otherwise contour” their migration (Carter 2011b, 72). 
In response, Carter asserts that there is a need to “shift the theoretical premise from 
global institutional structures, typological categorizations and spatially constrictive theories 
that treat localities as discrete entities . . . to one that centers on the experiences of people 
and the spaces through which they move” (Carter 2011b, 67).  Working through a 
framework of transnationalism accomplishes this. 
A transnational approach to sport migration “allows for the specificities of local 
conditions and alters the discourse of sport migration from impersonal, structural moves to 
embodied movements” (Carter 2011a, 15).  It also gives greater recognition and emphasis to 
states and the ways they affect migrations (Carter 2011a, 15).  As such, we are ultimately 
able to acquire perspectives informed by “social institutions, states, families, governing 
bodies, employers, and individual migrants’ own social and professional networks,” rather 
than just by global factors (Carter 2011b, 68).  Applying this approach to Cuban baseball 
defectors, we move beyond the deterministic discourses regarding MLB’s global reach and 
the natural movement of baseball talent to it.  Instead, we are encouraged to closely examine 
the personal negotiations among families, baseball scouts, and others as they interact with 
their governmental and institutional circumstances, such as immigration laws and MLB 
eligibility rules.  In short, transnationalism recognizes a sport migrant’s agency without 
denying the role that governments and other institutions play in shaping their experiences.  
As I began to research the literature on Cuban baseball defection experience, 
specifically seeking perspectives beyond the prevalent “glossy reification of glamour that 
sporting celebrity brings” (Carter 2011a, 6) or what I refer to as the “rags to riches” 
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narrative, I found few sources that address the experiences of athletes and even fewer that 
mentioned the experience of family remaining in Cuba.  Among journalistic accounts, many 
sources failed to provide specifics and/or used euphemistic phrases to gloss over defection 
experience (Kepner 2004; Lee 2013; McKinley 1999; Merkin 2009; Sanchez 2012; Wulf 
1993).  For example, New York Times reporter Eric Schmitt (1998) refers to the “certain 
reprisal” and “hardships” ballplayers may face if repatriated to Cuba, but fails to elaborate 
further.  Likewise, sport journalist Tim Brown (2010) fails to provide additional details after 
noting that the situation for the families of baseball defectors “remain[s] dire” and that 
“repression [against potential defectors] is greater.”  The regrettable consequence of reports 
such as these is that, because they generalize, downplay, or even neglect baseball defection 
experiences, the “rags to riches” narrative remains unchallenged and the public remains 
unaware of the more complicated and, at times, problematic experiences of those engaged in 
baseball defection.  Fortunately, there has been a recent upsurge in interest regarding 
baseball defectors, which has led to more journalists examining baseball defection 
experiences and, in a few instances, expanding their focus to the experience of the athlete’s 
family (Eden 2014; Katz 2014; Passan, Robinson, and Getlin 2013; Saracevic 2013; Slusser 
and Bulwa 2013) 
Fainaru and Sánchez’s The Duke of Havana (2001) is arguably the most thorough 
examination of a baseball defection experience, as it provides great detail regarding Orlando 
“El Duque” Hernández’s migration (the experience of his brother, Liván, is also discussed 
but only as it pertains to Orlando’s experience).  However, because Fainaru and Sánchez’s 
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work constitutes a case study and “El Duque” Hernández’s defection was exceptional1, its 
applicability to other experiences is limited.  Thomas F. Carter’s In Foreign Fields (2011a), 
on the other hand, uses ethnographic fieldwork based in anthropological discourses of sport 
migration to gain an understanding of the “experiences, concerns and strategies of 
transnational sport migrants” as they are affected by personal and local factors (5-6).  
Ultimately, his insight into the individual and familial experiences of baseball defection is 
unmatched and his approach serves as a model to future works on the subject.  In spite of 
this, perhaps because Carter seeks conclusions and models that are generalizable to all 
transnational sport migrants, his discussion about the impact that illegality has in Cuban 
baseball defection is understated. 
  
                                                
1 Due to his high profile status, Hernández received special considerations and treatment 
from the Bahamian and United States governments that have not been granted to others 
since. 
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Chapter One 
Scouting Report: Athlete and Family Experience in Cuban Baseball Defection 
Widespread sports media attention has been given to ballplayers who have defected 
from Cuba to pursue professional baseball careers in the United States since René Arocha’s 
defection in 1991.  But few have examined the experience of defection.  Indeed, several 
publications have provided the lighthearted “rags to riches” narration of defection, where the 
ballplayer makes the difficult decision to leave Cuba, embarks on an arduous journey where 
hardship and the possibility of death are ever-present, but eventually makes it to the United 
States, onto a Major League Baseball (MLB) roster, and thus lives happily ever after (Nomai 
and Dionisopoulos 2002).  Such triumphant stories make for enjoyable reads, but they are 
uncommon and ultimately incomplete.  Typically missing from these accounts are the 
experience of defection, including the considerations that athletes negotiate within 
themselves and with their families, the various risks they assume by choosing to defect, and 
the effects their decisions have on those remaining in Cuba. 
Undoubtedly, individual baseball defection experiences vary from person to person.  
Where one athlete may have been offered the assistance of a network of individuals to 
quickly arrive in the United States without any trouble, others have had to undertake the 
journey alone and overcome not only physical dangers, but complicated and slow 
immigration bureaucracy that may result in their becoming stranded or even detained along 
the way.  Where one ballplayer’s family may have been able to join them in the move to the 
United States, another’s family may have been denied the opportunity to relocate outside of 
the island, and yet another’s expresses no desire to leave Cuba at all.  This study utilizes 
publications about baseball defection experiences that have appeared over time to discover 
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commonalities as well as differences, and ultimately seeks to complicate our understanding 
of them through detailed analysis of its various components. 
A. Surveying Prior Baseball Defection Experiences 
The stereotypical portrayal of a baseball defection experience is not much different 
than that of non-athlete Cuban migrants.  Usually, the story involves a person who decides 
to leave Cuba, embarks on an improvised and unreliable raft, floats in the ocean for several 
days, and after becoming starved and dehydrated, arrives in the United States.  While this 
telling may not be entirely inaccurate for some baseball defection experiences, it certainly 
does not represent the great majority.   
Among the most comprehensive attempts to understand the experiences of Cuban 
baseball defection is Thomas F. Carter’s In Foreign Fields (2011a).  In it Carter employs 
anthropological ethnography in order to gain a “nuanced” understanding of transnational 
sport migration (Carter 2011a, 10).  Although Carter dedicates much of his book to the 
establishment of transnationalism as a superior analytical framework (as opposed to 
globalization) with which to examine contemporary sport migration experiences, he 
nonetheless makes a substantive contribution to the topic of Cuban baseball defection 
experiences.  In the chapter entitled “Family Matters: Risks and Costs of Mobility,” Carter 
focuses on the “effects, affects and experiences of family in relation to a migrant’s own 
mobility” (Carter 2011a, 13).  Speaking generally about the experience of transnational sport 
migrants, he notes that the decision to migrate is “never simply an individual choice” (Carter 
2011a, 127).  As such, he explores the manner that families as “units” negotiate the 
concerns—global and local—that arise prior to and following a sport migration (Carter 
2011a, 129-34).  The concerns he identifies as applicable to most transnational sport 
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migration experiences are “who should travel, for how long, what route(s) should be taken, 
what risks such moves engender, and what will happen to those who stay behind” (Carter 
2011a, 127). 
Illegality 
Examining each of these considerations as they apply to the Cuban baseball defector 
experience, the uniqueness of the situation quickly becomes clear, since the most pertinent 
characteristic in each consideration is the underlying illegality of the migration itself.  Just 
three years after the success of its 1959 revolution, the Cuban government under Fidel 
Castro enacted strict constraints on the ability of its citizens to travel outside the island.  The 
government has maintained this tight control over the years, essentially making it impossible 
for the majority of its citizens, especially its baseball athletes2, to partake in legal foreign 
travel (“Families Torn Apart” 2005, 8-9).  Consequently, of the more than a million Cubans 
that have emigrated from the island since the revolution, most, including virtually every one 
of the more than 250 baseball athletes, have had to do so through unauthorized means 
(Pedraza 2007, 1; “Complete list of known Cuban baseball Defectors” 2014)3. 
Due to the centrality of illegality in baseball defection, the concern about the risks 
involved in this form of sport migration pervades each stage of the experience.  Unlike the 
other transnational sport migrants Carter employs as illustrations of his thesis (e.g. athletes 
                                                
2 Other athletes and artists, such as boxers, musicians, and dancers, have also been 
subject to similar restraints.  However, these other groups have not garnered the same level 
of attention from the government, nor have they emigrated in as great of numbers. 
 
3 A review of the data provided by Cubanball.com on known defectors (see Appendix 1) 
reveals only two instances in which a player departed from Cuba legally before defecting.  
This number does not include ballplayers who defected while abroad with Selección Cuba 
since their departure from the team constituted an illegal act in the eyes of the Cuban 
government. 
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from cricket, tennis, golf, basketball, soccer, handball, field and ice hockey, rugby, and 
baseball athletes from countries other than Cuba), those negotiating a decision to defect 
from Cuba must preface their deliberations by considering the risk of illegality.  
Furthermore, in surveying the risks of baseball defection, it becomes apparent they can best 
be viewed as a fusion of the risks faced by transnational sport migrants and those faced by 
non-athlete Cubans who attempt to leave the island through extralegal means.  As such, we 
can see that the cause for any given risk may stem from the individual’s status as a migrant 
athlete, from the illegality of their means of migration, or from a combination of both. 
One significant risk encountered in defection, which is unmistakably an upshot of its 
illegal nature, emerges even before a Cuban athlete ever takes a migratory action.  Whereas 
other sport migrants need not harbor fear about disclosing their consideration of migration 
and, in fact, typically incorporate many people into those deliberations (Carter 2011a, 127), 
Cuban baseball defectors must exercise much greater caution about whom they speak with 
because they are at risk of significant punishments if found out.  If the government or 
INDER (Instituto Nacional de Deportes Educación Física y Recreación, Cuba’s national 
administration for sport) even suspect a ballplayer may defect, they often move to suspend 
him from competing in the Serie Nacional (Cuba’s premier baseball league) or for Selección 
Cuba (Cuba’s international squad).  A prominent example of this can be found in the 
suspensions of Orlando “El Duque” Hernández and Germán Mesa—the ace pitcher and star 
shortstop of Selección Cuba, respectively—immediately before the 1996 Summer Olympics 
in Atlanta.  At the time of their suspensions, Hernández and Mesa were widely beloved in 
Cuba and, today, are regarded among the nation’s all-time baseball greats.  Nevertheless, 
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when government officials suspected that Hernández might defect4 and perhaps convince his 
good friend Mesa to join him, they suspended them both first from Selección Cuba, then 
from participation in the Serie Nacional (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001).  A second frequently 
cited example is that of Eduardo Paret, Osmani García, and Angel López who were banned 
from playing baseball in July 1997 for simply talking on the phone with Rolando Arrojo, a 
ballplayer who defected in 1996 (Jamail 2000, 88).  In lieu of outright suspension, and given 
that many prominent ballplayers have defected while legally abroad playing in international 
tournaments with Selección Cuba5, another deterrent utilized on those the government 
considers to be potential defectors is to relegate them from the elite Selección Cuba team to 
the national squads that do not travel abroad.  Although Cuban authorities have never 
officially admitted to this practice and would assert each athlete’s performance is the sole 
determinant of his placement, both Yoenis Céspedes and Yasiel Puig claimed they were 
excluded from Selección Cuba for this reason and cite it as among their foremost 
motivations for defecting (Slusser and Bulwa 2013).  Lastly, in much harsher instances, 
there are reports of government officials seeking to employ “preventative punishment”6 
whereby athletes have been detained, interrogated, monitored, and/or had their benefits or 
                                                
4 Orlando Hernández’s younger half-brother, Liván, defected in 1995 and had sent 
money and clothing to Orlando through a man the government suspected was preparing to 
help Orlando defect.  However, at this time and even still today, sending gifts through 
individuals who can move more freely between the two countries is commonplace.  Also, 
Orlando Hernández has steadfastly maintained he was never interested in defecting from 
Cuba until after he was banned. 
 
5 A partial list of those who have defected while legally abroad with Selección Cuba 
includes some of the most famous ballplayers who have ever defected. They include René 
Arocha, Rolando Arrojo, Rey Ordóñez, Liván Hernández, José Contreras, José Iglesias, 
Aroldis Chapman, and Leonys Martín. 
 
6 A term used by Historian Roberto González Echevarría in the documentary, Stealing 
Home (2000). 
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employment opportunities reduced for allegedly considering defection (Brown 2010; Carter 
2011a; Echevarría 1999; Fainaru and Sánchez 2001; Jamail 2000; McKinley 1999; Schmitt 
1998; Stealing Home 2000). 
An athlete also assumes substantial legal risks while attempting defection.  If he—or 
any other Cuban citizen for that matter—is caught attempting to leave the country without 
first obtaining the proper authorization, he may be tried and sentenced to up to three years in 
prison (“Families Torn Apart” 2005).  Although in recent years, baseball athletes caught 
trying to defect have more commonly faced the aforementioned suspensions from 
competition, the risk of imprisonment still remains.  
While it is true that travel restrictions have eased for most Cubans as part of revised 
exit visa guidelines adopted in January 2013, the reforms have not been extended to baseball 
athletes due to the vague “public interest” clause included within the new rules (“Travel 
from Cuba” 2012).  Specifically, as was indicated in an article published in Juventud 
Rebelde, Decree 306, Article 1 of the new travel regulations declares that in the interest of 
preserving the skilled workforce necessary for Cuba’s “economic, social, and scientific” 
development, “high-caliber athletes” whose skills are “vital” to the Cuban “sport 
movement” are included in the list of professionals who must receive special authorization 
to leave the island (“Respuestas a inquietudes del pueblo” 2012).  It is important to note here 
that numerous international human rights agreements and international legal precedents 
guarantee the free movement of individuals to and from their home nation (“Families Torn 
Apart” 2005, 64).  Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by 
the United Nations, which Cuba voted for, asserts, “Everyone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country.”  As such, the denial of exit visas to 
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ballplayers over concerns that they will take their athletic talents elsewhere represents much 
more than unfairness; it constitutes a violation of customary international law and basic 
human rights. 
Simply making it off the island does not bring an end to an athlete’s legal problems, 
since Cuban law is not the only one affecting their ability to reach their destinations.  Due to 
the large influx of refugees fleeing Cuba in the early 1990s during the economic depression 
known as the “Special Period,” the Clinton Administration enacted the “Wet Foot, Dry 
Foot” rule (Solomon 2011, 166).  This states that Cubans who are intercepted by US 
authorities while at sea will be repatriated to Cuba, but those who reach United States soil 
will remain protected under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and allowed to stay in the 
United States as political refugees (Frankel 2005, 394; Gibbs 2011, 69-70; Fainaru and 
Sánchez 2001, 208).  Furthermore, if an athlete comes under the jurisdiction of another 
country while in transit—there are numerous instances of Bahamian authorities intercepting 
baseball defectors—they become subject to whatever migration laws and bureaucracies that 
country maintains and may even get stalled there for an indefinite amount of time (Frankel 
2005, 395). 
Defection Routes 
Cuban ballplayers are also likely to encounter multiple risks to their physical safety, 
regardless of the route they elect to undertake their defections.  Again, because of the 
illegality of their form of migration, defectors have only illicit options from which to choose 
and, thus, must assume certain risks.  This is not to say, however, that their mobility is 
necessarily limited.  “Mobility,” as Carter discusses it, is a “highly valued commodity whose 
production is based on the local material conditions where the potential migrant currently is 
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and where he or she intends to arrive” (Carter 2011a, 17; author’s emphasis).  In regard to a 
Cuban baseball player’s ability to travel abroad, their mobility is decreased by their status as 
baseball athletes.  Indeed, the government’s continual efforts to limit a ballplayer’s ability to 
legally leave Cuba are only due to that athlete’s superior talent, a quality that amplifies their 
fame, or what Carter calls their “visibility” (Carter 2011a, 17).  Simultaneously though, their 
heightened visibility increases their mobility being that it generates illicit emigration options 
for them that are not accessible or viable to most Cubans.  This is true in the sense that as 
their visibility increases so does their earning potential if they defect and play professional 
baseball in MLB.  Therefore, all those hoping to profit from those potential future earnings, 
such as agents, trainers, or smugglers, have greater motivation to facilitate an athlete’s safe 
and expedient defection. 
Arguably the most preferred option a ballplayer trying to defect has is to do so while 
legally outside of Cuba.  There have been numerous instances in which a ballplayer defected 
by separating himself from the Cuban team and Cuban officials while playing in an 
international tournament.  For the player, this method is especially beneficial if he is in the 
United States when they defect because it eliminates many of risks that those illegally 
leaving Cuba encounter, such as crossing ocean waters.  By defecting in the United States, 
they are also able to claim asylum and do not have a need to make further, potentially illicit 
and dangerous, travel arrangements to reach their ultimate destination.  To find an example 
of this kind of defection, one need look no further than the case of René Arocha, the first 
Cuban baseball defector.  In July 1991, while traveling through Miami International Airport 
with Selección Cuba following a series of exhibition games against Team USA, Arocha 
walked away from his teammates, passed through an exit door, and got in a friend’s car, 
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effectively defecting from his home county (Wulf 1993).  While his defection was still 
considered illegal by the Cuban government, since he was the first defector, Arocha did not 
have to confront the various limits to his mobility put in place by the Cuban government 
now.  His status as an athlete did benefit him though, as it increased his mobility by 
providing him the opportunity to legally travel to the United States where he could then 
accomplish his defection.   
In instances when an ballplayer is not in the nation they ultimately hope to reach and 
must make potentially unlawful arrangements to get there, history has proven time and again 
there is almost no effect on their ability or willingness to defect.  Liván Hernández’s 
defection experience provides an example of this.  While training with Selección Cuba in 
Monterrey, Mexico in 1995, Hernández fled from the team dormitory in the middle of the 
night to meet and leave Mexico with sports agent Joe Cubas7 (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 
92).  By this time, the Cuban government had begun limiting the mobility of its athletes 
primarily by monitoring potential defectors.  But Hernández’s mobility was increased by his 
visibility as a promising baseball player.  That visibility enabled him to legally travel abroad 
as part of the Selección Cuba squad and attract the assistance of someone who had made 
arrangements to facilitate his defection.  A second instructive case is that of Aroldis 
Chapman who defected in 2009, while in the Netherlands with Selección Cuba (Carter 
2011a, 178).  Chapman’s case is especially significant because it demonstrates the 
substantial impact of visibility and mobility in baseball defections.  Following the wave of 
defections that occurred in the late 1990s after Liván Hernández’s defection and the new era 
of Cuban government limitations on ballplayers’ mobility, it became increasingly difficult 
                                                
7 Joe Cubas is a Cuban-American sport agent who would became (in)famous for his 
assistance of numerous prominent baseball defectors. 
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for ballplayers to defect.  Moreover, Chapman was under increased scrutiny at the time of 
his defection because he had been caught once before attempting to defect (Eden 2014).  
Nevertheless, the extraordinary demand for his mobility, generated by the visibility he 
garnered as a baseball talent, still overcame the restraints placed by Cuban officials.   
When it became apparent that some Cuban ballplayers could earn millions of dollars 
if they were able to defect from Cuba, both athletes and agents were not willing to wait until 
the ballplayer was able to travel abroad before defecting, electing instead to coordinate 
defections from the island.  In fact, approximately 16% of the 255 defections tracked by 
Cubanball.com were accomplished while the athlete was legally abroad (see Appendix 1), 
meaning most defectors left from Cuba.  With this staggering demand, sport agents like Joe 
Cubas and Gus Domínguez emerged in the early 1990s to recruit and shepherd defectors to 
MLB using a network of contacts.  Between the mid-1990s to early 2000s, this defection 
route became the leading method by which ballplayers left Cuba.   
By defecting from the island, athletes assume many more risks than those who defect 
while abroad.  Their experience becomes more comparable to that of the thousands of non-
athlete Cubans who have fled from the island since the revolution (Jamail 2000, 91).  At a 
basic level, this method of defection entails many of the elements of the stereotypical 
portrayal of Cuban emigration.  It usually requires the defector to embark by sea in 
unreliable, inadequate, and ultimately unsafe boats (Echevarría, 389 1999; Frankel 2005, 
408-210; Solomon 2011, 162).  Many accounts note that the parties embarked with limited 
and, at times, insufficient supplies and were often on vessels captained by inexperienced 
individuals (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 205; Jamail 2000, 91; Passan 2013; Price 1998).  
Consequently, in addition to the legal risks of defection, athletes undoubtedly place their 
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lives in danger by defecting in this way.  To be sure, since baseball defectors represent a 
revenue source for those involved in arranging defections, there are incentives to add 
precautions—i.e., precise coordination and reliable transport—to ensure a defector reaches 
his destination.  However, given the demand (and desperation) to prioritize success over 
safety involved in these baseball defections, it is not uncommon for compromises of the 
latter to be made for the benefit of the former. 
The defection of Orlando “El Duque” Hernández in December 1997 is perhaps the 
most famous and widely examined defection ever, having been the subject of many 
newspaper and magazine articles as well as the book, The Duke of Havana (2001).  This 
case, then, is the clearest example of a defection from Cuba organized by outside interested 
parties.  It was Hernández’s great-uncle, Ocilio Cruz, who ultimately masterminded the 
pitcher’s defection (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 182).  Cruz reportedly collaborated with a 
man who went by the nickname “El Argentino”8 who, in turn, made arrangements with a 
fisherman named Juan Carlos Romero who sailed the boat used to transport Hernández and 
those accompanying him away from the island.  Upon leaving Cuba, the boat travelled to 
Anguilla Cay9, about 70 miles from Miami, where it left Hernández’s group (Fainaru and 
Sánchez 2001, 204).  From there, the plan was for the group to be picked up by a speedboat 
Cruz had arranged and be taken to the United States.  Once there, they could claim 
asylum—for those with the means, a speedboat allows them to evade Coast Guard 
                                                
8 Fainaru and Sánchez note that in their one meeting with El Argentino, he introduced 
himself as Jorge Ramís, though it appears they reserve doubt about the validity of this name.  
It is also worth noting that Cruz’s agreement with El Argentino established that, in exchange 
for serving as liaison between Miami and Cuba, El Argentino would serve as Hernández’s 
agent upon defection (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 187-188). 
 
9 Anguilla Cay is the most southeastern island in the Cay Sal Bank of the Bahamas (see 
Appendix 3). 
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authorities and, thus, the potential to be intercepted and repatriated to Cuba.  However, the 
speedboat never made it to Anguilla Cay and the group was stranded on the island for four 
days before a United States Coast Guard helicopter spotted the group and sent a boat to 
retrieve them.  Since the island chain they had made it to is within Bahamian jurisdiction, 
the group was transported to the Bahamas where, according to a general agreement between 
the Bahamas and Cuba, they were to be processed for repatriation.  This never occurred.  
Once news of Hernández’s defection reached the United States, Joe Cubas, the Cuban 
American National Foundation, and various members of Congress, joined the effort to 
prevent Hernández’s repatriation and facilitate his ultimate entry into the United States 
through several legal loopholes and exceptions (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 212-221; Jamail 
2000, 91-92; Schmitt 1998). 
What we can glean from Hernández’s experience is yet another example of the 
clashing limits and increase to mobility found in baseball defection.  As a famous ballplayer 
in Cuba whom the government considered to be a defection risk, Hernández did not have the 
option to either legally exit Cuba or defect while legally abroad.  Instead, he was forced to 
undertake his defection through illicit means and risk substantial physical and legal 
repercussions.  His visibility produced greater demand for his defection, leading interested 
parties to become involved in the effort, thereby increasing Hernández’s mobility.  These 
combined factors ultimately resulted in the botched defection attempt that put Hernández 
and his party in physical danger (marooning at Anguilla Cay), at legal risk (potential for 
repatriation).  But it also allowed him to escape Cuba (coordination of transport) and 
ultimately gain entry into the United States (special treatment due to the involvement of 
influential individuals).  Other examples of players who defected with the assistance of 
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agents are Jorge Luis Toca, Angel López, Jorge Díaz, and Maykel Jova (Jamail 2000, 94-
97), as well as Osbek Castillo, Francisely Bueno (“Convicted sports agent” 2007), and 
Yoenis Céspedes more recently (Slusser and Bulwa 2013). 
Despite the level of relative professionalization of agents aiding defections 
throughout the 1990s, as well as the fact MLB, for all intents and purposes, sanctioned and 
encouraged this defection route through its policies that allowed for the signing of defectors 
to lucrative contracts (Carter 2011a, 165; Cwiertney 2000, 417-419; Frankel 2005, 397; 
Greller 1999, 1664-1679; Solomon 2011, 160), it is not a stretch to say that this route is a 
form of human smuggling.  Indeed, there examples in Cuba and the United States of an 
agent being arrested and convicted for their roles in coordinating or aiding baseball 
defections.  In Cuba, Juan Ignacio Hernández Nodar was sentenced to fifteen years in prison 
in October 199610 for “five counts of illegal departure,” one count for each of the five Cuban 
ballplayers he had reportedly encouraged to defect (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 148-151).  In 
the United States, Gus Domínguez was convicted in April 2007 for conspiring to smuggle 
five ballplayers out of Cuba in 2004 (“Convicted sports agent” 2007).  He was eventually 
sentenced to five years in prison, but was released after serving three years and nine months 
of his sentence (“Sports agent's conviction reversed” 2011).  However, following the 
crackdown on these agents, and especially after the precedent set by the Cuban government 
with Hernández Nodar, fewer agents were willing to risk directly aiding defections (Carter 
2011a, 178).  Instead, as is seen most commonly today, agents are content with waiting for a 
defection to occur, then pursuing the ballplayer as a client after he has reached foreign soil.  
This places the onus of arranging defections much more on the athlete.  Be that as it may, 
                                                
10 Hernández Nodar ultimately remained in prison for 13 years, two months and 27 days 
and was released and deported from Cuba in November 2009 (Rhoads 2010). 
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the demand for these athletes and potential for profit have not decreased at all.  
Consequently, a glut of facilitators—particularly criminally-connected human smugglers, 
many of whom had already been smuggling non-athlete Cubans away from the island for 
years (Brown D. 2002, 279)—have eagerly taken the place of agents in ensuring the 
mobility of baseball defectors in order to reap the available profits. 
As is the case with most other Cuban émigrés who leave the island without 
permission, baseball defectors can attempt migration from Cuba on their own through 
whatever means they can contrive.  However, in consideration of the significant danger 
present in migrating by sea, as well as the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” rule that severely lessens 
the likelihood that migrants will successfully reach their destination, most migrants, 
including baseball defectors, solicit the services of professional human smugglers (Brown, 
D. 2002, 279; Solomon 2011, 166).  To do so, many ballplayers use Cuba’s widespread 
black market (Eden 2014) or interested parties living abroad (most often, family and friends) 
hire human smuggling networks after learning of the athlete’s interest in defecting (Eden 
2014; Passan, Robinson, and Getlin 2013).  Also, smuggling networks have begun recruiting 
ballplayers to defect, then auctioning them off to the highest bidder once abroad (Eden 
2014).  By taking this route, baseball defectors are provided with much more reliable, 
speedy, and maneuverable vessels, boat captains with an expertise in navigating these 
waters, and an underground network capable of providing the “necessary logistical 
coordination of the covert transit” (Brown, D. 2002, 279).  Despite these advantages, this 
method of defection is by no means without its set of risks.  Defectors still assume all legal 
risks mentioned prior.  While defectors might encounter fewer risks to their physical safety 
given the more reliable vessels and more experienced captains, since the primary objective 
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of these operations is to maximize profit, the boats professional smugglers use to transport 
defectors are often dangerously overcrowded (Brown, D. 2002, 280).  Because the 
professional smuggling operations are generally connected to organized crime networks, the 
employment of coercion and violence are much more prevalent than what is seen in any 
other defection route (Katz 2014; Passan, Robinson, and Getlin 2013). 
Due to the potential for retaliation defectors face if they discuss their experience with 
these criminal human smuggling networks, there have been few baseball defectors who have 
discussed the particulars of their migrations.  This makes the recently divulged experience of 
Yasiel Puig to Los Angeles Magazine (Katz 2014) and ESPN The Magazine (Eden 2014) 
that much more valuable.  According to the articles, Puig and his three companions, 
including his friend Yunior Despaigne who coordinated this and four of their prior defection 
attempts, enlisted a human smuggling operation with ties to Los Zetas, a crime syndicate 
that is among the most powerful and violent in Mexico, to accomplish their escape.  
Although it appears the 36-hour speedboat trip from Cuba to a Mexican island near Cancún 
was mostly uneventful11, Puig’s experience following his arrival in Mexico exemplifies 
some of the unique risks that defecting via illicit human smuggling networks may entail.   
Those hired to extricate Puig and his companions from Cuba were not hired by 
anyone part of the group migrating, but by Raúl Pacheco, a Miami resident who was a 
childhood acquaintance of Despaigne.  As is common among human smuggling operations, 
                                                
11 Eden only makes mention of the boat running out of fuel and how the group spent a 
night in the open ocean awaiting fuel from a colleague. 
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the smugglers were promised a prearranged sum of money12 by Pacheco, which would be 
paid upon the group’s arrival in Mexico.  However, after they arrived in Mexico, Puig and 
Despaigne discovered that Pacheco had failed to come up with the money and that they 
would be held captive at the smugglers’ complex until someone could pay the fee.  
According to Los Angeles Magazine, Despaigne says about this time:  
I don’t know if you could call it a kidnapping, because we had gone there 
voluntarily, but we also weren’t free to leave . . . If they didn’t receive the money, 
they were saying that at any moment they might give [Puig] a machetazo [machete 
blow]; chop off an arm, a finger, whatever, and he would never play baseball again, 
not for anyone. (Katz 2014) 
It was at this point that a man Eden identifies only as “El Rubio” (The blonde) 
stepped in agreeing to pay the smugglers who had increased the price to $400,000.  But 
before he paid the money, El Rubio executed an escape plan in which Puig and his 
companions were snuck out of the smugglers’ compound in the middle of the night, taken to 
Cancún by boat, then flown to Mexico City where Puig was showcased and eventually 
signed to a $42 million contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers.  Unfortunately for Puig and 
his companions, due to these entanglements with criminal networks, their problems did not 
end there.  Upon their arrival in the United States, they received continuous threats from 
representatives of the smugglers’ and Los Zetas cartel they had crossed (Eden 2014).  
Although most of the threats they received were by phone, Eden notes that Puig was 
reportedly confronted one night by cartel members while training with the Dodgers in 
Arizona.  Despaigne says that he was threatened with a gun to his head while in Hialeah, FL.  
It is unclear how it came to pass and whether the timing was simply coincidental, but soon 
after Puig spoke about their concerns over these threats with either El Rubio (Eden 2014) or 
                                                
12 Eden notes that the standard price this particular group charges to smuggle Cubans to 
Mexico is $10,000/person; however, given Puig’s notoriety, Pacheco agreed to pay 
$250,000. 
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with a man named Gilberto Suárez (Katz 2014), the body of one of the smuggling group’s 
leaders was found in Cancún following an apparent execution.  Also, Eden notes that El 
Rubio had gone missing and may have been kidnapped and held for ransom by members of 
the smuggling group. 
Evaluating this experience, we see both increased mobility and increased risk.  Due 
to Puig’s fame as a professional athlete, he had a network of facilitators—Despaigne, 
Pacheco, El Rubio, the cartel-connected smugglers, and eventually a professional sports 
agent—working to ensure his successful defection.  Likewise, his notoriety gave him 
defection routes to which most Cubans do not have access.  He was extricated from Cuba 
via speedboat and with high-ranking members of the smuggling network aboard to ensure 
the success of the operation (Eden 2014), he was freed from the custody of the smuggling 
network through a covert raid when the money they were guaranteed was not paid, and he 
was escorted through an expedited migration process by both his agent and the Los Angeles 
Dodgers once he had reached Mexico City.  On the other hand, Puig also took on risks by 
utilizing this defection method.  First, despite the added care and attention the smuggling 
group gave to Puig’s extraction, the voyage between Cuba and Mexico still included a 
mishap that, given different circumstances, could have produced much greater danger to 
those aboard the vessel.  Second, since Puig enlisted the services of cartel-connected 
smugglers, intimidation through the threat of violence (and the actual occurrence of it) was 
ubiquitous not only after he arrived in Mexico, but even after he had reached the United 
States.   
A second documented example of a player who defected using this route is Leonys 
Martín.  In 2010, Martín hired smugglers to transport himself and four others out of Cuba.  
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However, once the group reached Mexico, the smugglers reportedly held him and the rest of 
his group captive at gunpoint for several months until they coerced approximately $1.35 
million from him, which they claimed Martín owed for their services (Passan, Robinson, and 
Getlin 2013).  Again, what we see in this experience is both the increased mobility of the 
ballplayer who was able to arrange for a private extraction of him and his group out of Cuba, 
but also the manifestation of the added risks that he assumes when utilizing this illicit route. 
The route Cuban baseball defectors take to reach their destination consists of more 
than just the method by which they escape the island nation, as defection no longer entails 
simply travelling from Cuba to the United States.  Rather, since the mid-1990s, defectors 
have sought third-party nations as their initial destinations.  This indirect route taken by 
practically every baseball defector since Liván Hernández13 stems from the rules that 
regulate the maximum dollar amount MLB teams can pay a ballplayer subject to the 
domestic draft versus a foreign free agent.  Consequently, while a defector’s “point of 
arrival,” or the physical location they wish to reach, is ultimately the United States, they first 
seek at least one other “point” within Latin America or the Caribbean because their “place of 
destination”—that is to say the goal to which migrants (and other interested parties) aspire—
is Major League Baseball and a lucrative contract (Carter 2011a, 19-20).  This route has the 
defector avoid initially travelling to the United States because, upon their arrival, they would 
be deemed a refugee and granted residency.  While this certainly would be a desirable 
outcome for any other migrant from Cuba, for professional baseball players, this would 
                                                
13 Though it is unclear (Jamail 2000, 80), many sources credit Joe Cubas for discovering 
this loophole in MLB policy and this defection route has been called the “‘El Duque’ 
Model” (Greller 1999, 1673), “Joe Cubas’ route” (Solomon 2011, 160), “Joe Cubas’ ‘New 
Route’” (Frankel 2005, 398; Chass 1995), “Joe Cubas Plan” (Fainaru and Sanchez 2001, 
80), and even Cubas’ “coup within the global baseball industry” (Carter 2011a, 165). 
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mean they are subject to the domestic draft and that their initial signing bonuses would be 
capped according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiated between MLB 
and the Player’s Association (MLBPA) (Frankel 2005, 395-396).  On the other hand, if a 
defector travels from Cuba to any other country and establishes residency there, MLB 
classifies him as an international free agent and his initial signing bonus is unregulated14.  In 
this way, baseball defectors employ a form of what Aihwa Ong termed “flexible citizenship” 
(1999)—referring to the various strategies migrants can use to exploit or circumvent the 
laws/regulations of one locale/jurisdiction so as to benefit them in another—in order to 
maximize their initial earnings.   
Several problems can arise by taking this route, since athletes become subject to the 
complicated residency and migration laws and processes of whatever nation they select as 
their initial point of arrival.  Due to these intertwining and, at times, conflicting laws and 
regulations, many ballplayers have found themselves indefinitely stuck in one nation 
awaiting residency papers or clearance to enter the United States, and some have even been 
held in custody for various immigration violations.  For example, Orlando “El Duque” 
Hernández was held in the Bahamas until he received clearance to leave, at which point he 
secretly traveled to Costa Rica where he awaited approval of his residency there before he 
signed with an MLB team and was legally able to enter the United States (Fainaru and 
                                                
14 This rule was changed slightly with the implementation of the 2012 CBA.  It stipulates 
that those who have played less than 7 years in Cuba’s Serie Nacional are subject to an 
International Signing Bonus Pool for which teams are allocated a certain amount each year 
and are penalized upon exceeding it.  However, for those who played in the Serie Nacional 
for more than 7 years, there is still no limit to the dollar amount they can receive since their 
bonuses are not subject to this pool.  The implementation of this new rule has had no effect 
on the number of ballplayers attempting defection. 
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Sánchez 2001, 212-221).  A few other examples—though many more could be included in 
this list—are Rolando Arrojo, Andy Morales, and Yuniesky Betancourt (Carter 2011a, 166). 
Length of Stay 
The length of time an athlete will remain away from Cuba after their departure was a 
wholly irrelevant matter in baseball defections until recently.  Due to the illegality of their 
emigration from Cuba, ballplayers were effectively prohibited from returning to the island 
and could be subject to criminal charges if they did manage to return (Franks 2013).  As a 
result, those who previously elected to defect from Cuba to play in MLB were doing so 
knowing that they would never return to the island.  However, along with a larger easing of 
travel restrictions in January 2013, the Cuban government enacted a modification to the laws 
regarding a defector’s return.  Now, an athlete who has been living outside of the island as a 
defector for more than eight years may return without facing any legal repercussions (Franks 
2013).  Some baseball defectors, the most prominent of which have been José Contreras 
(Franks 2013) and Rey Ordóñez (“Cuba Travel” 2013), have taken advantage of this eased 
policy to return to the island for the first time in several years.  But it remains to be seen 
whether those considering defection since this modification now negotiate over a specific 
amount of time they will live abroad before they return to Cuba.  Nevertheless, ballplayers 
who defect from Cuba must wait a minimum of 8 years before having the opportunity to 
return to their homeland and reunite with those they left behind. 
Migration Companions 
Up to this point, the focus of this examination has almost exclusively remained on 
the athletes who defect.  However, it is not uncommon for baseball defectors to be 
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accompanied by immediate family members, girlfriends, and friends on their emigrations.  
The reason for is likely related to the forced separation that baseball defection entails.  At 
the same time, the illegality and associated legal and physical risk inherent in a baseball 
defection prompts great concern about who, if anyone, will accompany the athlete leaving 
Cuba.  For those who do travel with a baseball defector, they benefit from the increased 
mobility the athlete garners since they have access to the same privileged migration routes, 
including any guidance and/or special treatment the athlete receives15.  If the ballplayer is 
able to successfully sign a contract with a Major League team, those who accompany him 
initially enter the United States in much better economic condition than almost all other non-
athlete Cuban migrants.  On the other hand, migration companions also assume all the same 
negative aspects of migration a ballplayer does when defecting.  This includes increased 
restriction to their mobility through intensified monitoring, the potential for severe legal 
penalties, forced separation from those they leave behind, as well as all potential physical 
dangers of a defection.  As was the case with the defection of Orlando “El Duque” 
Hernández, the family and friends that accompanied him experienced the same benefits of 
increased mobility throughout the defection process, as well as the same risks to their safety.  
Similarly, those who accompanied Yasiel Puig and Leonys Martín on their defections 
benefited from the private operations organized to ensure their successful extraction from 
Cuba, but also had to endure the same physical dangers (i.e. being held against their will and 
                                                
15 There have been few instances when travel companions not immediately related to the 
athlete, such as coaches or trainers, have not been afforded the same special treatment as the 
athlete they accompanied.  For example, Orlando Chinea, a pitching coach, was repatriated 
to Cuba despite the fact that a ballplayer he accompanied, Jorge Luis Toca, was granted a 
visa upon arriving in the Bahamas (Jamail 2000, 94-96). 
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threatened with bodily harm) that resulted from the use of criminally-connected smuggling 
networks. 
Family Left Behind 
Given the various considerations and substantial risks that comprise any defection 
from Cuba, it is not feasible for large groups of people to join the ballplayer in his defection.  
For those athletes who have defected with companions, the groups are always small and 
comprised only of those willing and able to assume not only the risks, but also the forced 
separation from their native country that this illegal migration entails.  As a result of these 
constraints, there are typically numerous immediate family members (i.e. parents, siblings, 
spouses, children, aunts, uncles, and in-laws) who continue to live in Cuba after the 
ballplayer’s defection.  For those who remain in Cuba, there is the potential for both positive 
and negative impacts stemming from their close connection to a baseball defector.   
A common motivating factor for migrants of every stripe is economic opportunity 
and the possibility of improving not just their own lives, but those of the family they left 
behind (Duany 2011, 147; Durand and Massey 2004, 6; Eckstein 2013, 96-100; Madianou 
and Miller 2012, 31-32).  The same certainly applies for transnational sport migrants, as well 
(Carter 2011a, 135).  Although the standard of living for Cubans today is not desperate16 and 
remittances do not represent a replacement of the state-apportioned rations or wages, the 
economic conditions are such that many Cubans have used remittances to improve their 
standard of living (Duany 2011, 147-148).  As such, when baseball defectors earn money as 
professional athletes abroad, they often immediately seek to send a portion of their earnings, 
                                                
16 According to the latest United Nations Human Development Report, Cuba was rated 
as having “Very High Human Development” levels and shows low undernourishment rates 
(United Nations Development Programme 2014). 
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either in cash or material goods, to their families remaining in Cuba.  When defectors send 
material goods, they typically include items that are difficult to acquire in Cuba regardless of 
financial means, such as electronics.  When they send cash, it allows family members to 
purchase additional goods through government-run stores (i.e. food, clothing, shoes, and 
household supplies), as well as services (i.e. repair work) that would be difficult to acquire 
solely through state allowances (Eckstein 2013, 99).  Hence, families left behind after a 
ballplayer defects experience a markedly improved standard of living. 
On the other hand, family members left behind following a defection also experience 
negative results.  For most families left behind in transnational sport migration, the risks 
they typically encounter stem from the change in socio-economic status they undergo as 
they become the benefactors of an influx of foreign capital from their athlete relatives 
abroad (Carter 2011a, 143).  As a result, the most common concern is the potential for them 
to become the targets of theft, robbery, or kidnapping.  While this may remain a 
consideration in Cuban baseball defection17, there are numerous other concerns since any 
ballplayer who defects to the United States—and into a baseball system Fidel Castro has 
derisively called “pelota esclava” (slave baseball) (Jamail 2000, 29)—can be regarded as a 
traitor to the Revolution and to Cuba (Frankel 2005, 401-402). 
Families left behind after a baseball defection encounter a forced separation from the 
athlete.  Most Cubans who migrate to the United States must wait approximately a year 
before they can return to Cuba to visit family, but given the added stigma baseball defection 
carries, defectors are unable to return to the island for a minimum of eight years.  As a 
                                                
17 Thus far, I have not found an account of family members of a baseball defector being 
targeted in this way. 
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result, the contact families in Cuba can have with an athlete abroad is limited to written 
correspondence, telephone calls, and email18 and many have discussed the anguish this 
causes for them and their families (Frey 1994; McKinley 1999; “NY Yankees Pitcher” 2004; 
Slusser and Bulwa 2013). 
The stigma attached to baseball defectors and those associated with them by the 
government has caused some families left behind to experience social isolation.  In some 
cases, neighbors avoided association with families of defectors either due to disdain for the 
defector’s migration or fear of facing reprisal from the Cuban government (Fainaru and 
Sánchez 2001, 163).  Fortunately, it appears less likely families experience this isolation 
nowadays since the prevalence of defections occurring throughout the 1990s resulted in 
more Cubans sympathizing with the defectors’ choice to migrate (Carter 2008b, 199). 
While some family members of baseball defectors left behind choose to remain in 
Cuba, many have sought and been denied permission to travel outside of the island.  In this 
way, families left behind often experience strict limitations to their mobility akin to the 
restrictions placed on ballplayers the government suspects of defection.  In Orlando “El 
Duque” Hernández’s case, Cuban authorities refused to allow his family to join him in the 
United States after his defection and Hernández believed he would never be reunited with 
them.  It was not until various people, including Archbishop of New York John Cardinal 
O’Connor, opened a dialogue with Cuban officials—initially with the Cuban Ambassador to 
the United Nations, then with Fidel Castro himself—that Hernández’s mother, his two 
daughters, and their mother were granted permission to join him in the United States 
                                                
18 Freedom House’s annual report on internet freedom notes that Cuba’s connection 
speeds are among the slowest in the world and make it nearly impossible for the use of 
multimedia applications, such as video chatting (“Cuba” 2013, 217).   
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(Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 284-293).  Other prominent examples are the family (wife and 
two children) of José Contreras, who were repeatedly denied exit visas despite having been 
granted entrance visas by the Nicaraguan government (“NY Yankees Pitcher” 2004), and 
that of Yoenis Céspedes (Lee 2013; Slusser and Bulwa 2013).  The latter two experiences 
are noteworthy because, unlike the extraordinary intervention to allow Hernández’s family 
to safely and legally leave Cuba, they represent a much more common experience.  The 
Cuban government refused to grant family members exit visas—possibly as a way to punish 
the defector—and left them without any means to legally travel abroad.  As a result, in both 
Contreras’ and Céspedes’ cases, their families were forced to undertake illicit, life-
threatening emigrations in order to reach the United States (Kepner 2004; Slusser and Bulwa 
2013).  Their experiences ultimately demonstrate more violations of Article 13(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—guaranteeing an individual’s right to travel to and 
from their own country—perpetrated by the Cuban government. 
There have been troubling claims that those remaining in Cuba have had their 
communications and movements subject to intense government supervision following an 
athlete’s defection (Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 188-189; Frey 1994; Jamail 2000, 88; 
McKinley 1999; Stealing Home 2000).  Several defectors have reported that family 
members left behind have been detained, interrogated, and/or arrested by government 
officials following their defection (Echevarría 1999, 395; Fainaru and Sánchez 2001, 136-
137; “NY Yankees Pitcher” 2004; Saracevic 2013; Slusser and Bulwa 2013).  Even though 
both of these concerns raise serious questions about unjust treatment and potential human 
rights abuses perpetrated against family members left behind in Cuba, neither has been 
thoroughly investigated or discussed in prior studies.   
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Another potential concern lacking prior consideration is whether families left behind 
have experienced reductions in government-provided benefits or demotions in state-
appointed employment, similar to those experienced by repatriated defectors (Fainaru and 
Sánchez 2001, 137-138; Jamail 2000, 96; McKinley 1999; Stealing Home 2000). 
Overall, the clearest conclusion that can be drawn about the experience of families 
left behind in Cuban baseball defections is that despite the fact that these defections have 
been occurring for two decades now, few have ever asked about a defector’s family 
remaining in Cuba.  For those who have written on the subject, few have provided detailed 
accounts about these experiences, and even fewer have obtained testimony from family still 
living there.  Unfortunately, given the time that has passed, it is possible that we may never 
know much about the experiences of the families of the first defectors—when it appeared 
the Cuban government treated defectors and their families more harshly.  Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that we begin to examine these experiences not only to gain a clearer 
understanding of them, but to also enable ourselves to scrutinize and prevent any injustices 
occurring within them. 
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Chapter Two 
Game Notes: A Case Study and Reflection on Cuban Baseball Defection 
A. Qualitative Research Considerations 
John Lofland and David Snow (2006) have asserted, “the structured [research 
method] seeks to determine the frequency of preconceived kinds of things, while the 
intensive qualitative interview seeks to find out what kinds of things exist in the first place” 
(17).  Additionally, Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune (2012) have suggested that qualitative 
methods in social science research are useful in allowing a researcher to examine the 
emotions, motivations, symbolism, meaning, and understanding of life experiences (15).  
Considering these points and given the overall lack of research into the individual and 
familial experiences found in Cuban baseball defection, I determined I could not rely solely 
on structured research methods, such as a survey of prior literature, to acquire the 
understanding I sought.  Furthermore, I concluded that structured methods would not allow 
me to highlight the gaps in knowledge or misguided approaches that have persisted within 
this subject.  Consequently, I chose to conduct original qualitative fieldwork in the form of 
in-person semi-structured interviews for this project. 
The individuals I sought to interview consisted of Cuban baseball defectors within 
the United States who were actively still playing professional baseball.  This group was 
“purposively selected” (Berg and Lune 2012, 52) because they were the most easily 
accessible individuals who could contribute to this project.  Also, baseball defectors could 
serve the dual-purpose of acting as both research subjects, due to their personal experiences 
with baseball defection, and “key informants” (Berg and Lune 2012, 42) due to their ability 
to relate the experiences of their family members.  Given that the eligible research subjects 
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for this project consisted of professional athletes, I was aware that the main obstacle I would 
have to overcome was the procurement of entrée and interviews.  As such, it was vital that I 
select a research site in which I could feasibly acquire interviews. 
I chose the Arizona Fall League (AFL)—a developmental league organized by MLB 
during the months of October and November in six cities around the Tempe/Phoenix area—
as my research site.  The AFL season consists of six teams made up of six of the best 
prospects19 from each MLB club who are chosen to participate so they may have more time 
to develop before the end of the baseball-playing season.  This was an ideal site for my 
research for several reasons.  First, through background research on all the active Cuban 
baseball defectors playing for MLB organizations, I determined five were selected by their 
organizations to participate in the AFL this particular year, that two pairs were on the same 
team, and that the six teams that comprise the AFL play in stadiums that are short driving 
distances from one another.  This meant that I would have a much greater chance of 
soliciting interviews not just from each of the five ballplayers participating in the league, but 
that I would have a greater chance of making contact with more than one research subject at 
a time.  This was especially important since I had no more than seven days to conduct 
research in Arizona and needed to be as efficient as possible with gaining entrée.  Second, 
since the athletes selected to play in the AFL are still in the developmental stages of their 
professional careers and have not yet gained widespread fame, they regularly welcome 
interaction with AFL spectators.  Third, because attendance at AFL games averages 
approximately 300 during day games and 600 during night games—a relatively small 
number for professional baseball—and that fans have easy access to the ballplayers before 
                                                
19 Ballplayers who typically have not yet made it to the Major League team, but are 
considered among the top baseball talents in their organization. 
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and after each game meant that the likelihood I would have face-to-face contact with the five 
potential subjects was very high. 
When AFL officials informed me that I was not eligible to receive interview 
credentials and my attempts to utilize various gatekeepers20 to gain entrée were 
unsuccessful, I began cold contacting the five potential research subjects—that is to say, I 
approached them without prior introduction or contact.  To make initial contact, I 
approached the ballplayers before and after games.  During this contact (and throughout all 
future interactions), I spoke only in Spanish and found that it made gaining entrée somewhat 
easier because there was a perceived sense of enjoyment they felt from being able to speak 
Spanish with a spectator—something they likely have not had many opportunities to do 
since arriving in the United States21. 
Ultimately, I was able to arrange and complete one interview during my time at the 
AFL.  My interview subject was Henry Urrutia, an outfielder and designated hitter in the 
Baltimore Orioles organization, who was playing for the Surprise Saguaros during the AFL 
season.  For the sake of convenience and Urrutia’s comfort, we conducted the interview in 
the team weight room at Surprise Stadium immediately following a game on November 9, 
2013.  The interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner,22 it was audio recorded 
digitally, and I took handwritten notes to supplement the recording.  In the months after our 
                                                
20 Individuals who have the ability to grant a researcher access to certain research sites 
(Berg and Lune 2012, 214-215). 
 
21 For more on the strategy of utilizing a group’s “argot”—the language, jargon, or slang 
of a particular group, see Berg and Lune, 213. 
 
22 See Appendix 2 for the interview guide. 
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interview, I sought follow-up contact with Urrutia to clarify and expand on some of his 
responses.  Unfortunately, I could not reestablish contact with him. 
Certainly, no one experience exemplifies all that can occur in baseball defections 
and, as it will be discussed, Urrutia’s defection is at times typical—that is to say it echoes 
the experience many other baseball defectors have related prior—and at other times unique.  
As such, I do not proffer his experience here as an archetype of all baseball defection 
experiences.  Instead, I present it as a case study of a recent baseball defection (he defected 
in September 2011) that scrutinizes the experience so as to acquire a nuanced understanding 
of its complexities as they pertain to the athlete and his family, as well as attempts to 
analyze what this experience may indicate about the current state of baseball defection in 
Cuba.  Furthermore, it demonstrates the kinds of questions that have not been sufficiently 
posed thus far and have resulted in our oversimplified and incomplete understanding of 
Cuban baseball defection experiences.  
B. Urrutia Family Defection Experience 
Henry Alexander Urrutia Rodríguez was born on February 13, 1987 in Las Tunas, 
Cuba.  He describes his life growing up as like any “normal Cuban.”  He attended and 
completed primary and secondary school and spent his childhood playing baseball.  He 
began playing when he was about 6 years old and says he only ever dreamed of playing at 
the highest levels.  However, unlike most Cubans, he grew up in a family of Cuban baseball 
royalty.  His father, Ermidelio Urrutia (born 1963), played in Cuba’s premier baseball 
league, Serie Nacional, for 16 seasons and was a key member of the Cuban national team 
for several international competitions, including the 1992 Summer Olympics where he 
earned a gold medal.  By the time he retired, Ermidelio’s career offensive statistics were 
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among the top-50 all-time in most categories and he was tied for 20th most career home runs.  
After his playing career ended, Ermidelio eventually became the manager of Las Tunas in 
Serie Nacional, a position he still maintains today.  As if his father’s legacy was not enough 
to live up to, Henry’s cousin, Osmani Urrutia (born 1976), compiled an even more 
impressive career in Cuba during his 16-year playing career and is considered to be among 
the greatest Cuban hitters ever, having won five straight batting titles, setting the single-
season batting average record (.469 in 2003-2004), and retiring with the second highest 
career batting average in Serie Nacional history.  Given this prestigious family lineage and 
his success at a young age—making it on a Serie Nacional roster by 18 years old and being 
among the top hitters in the league each season after his first—it shocked the Cuban baseball 
community when Urrutia defected in September 2011. 
As Urrutia makes clear, his motivation for defecting from Cuba was purely baseball-
related and he asserts that financial considerations never crossed his mind.  As he notes, his 
life in Cuba was one of “privilege in certain ways” both because of his family’s legacy and 
because Urrutia was a top-level ballplayer himself.  He and his family were never in want; 
they never lacked food, they lived in a good house, and even had a car.  He mentions that he 
knows many Cuban ballplayers have chosen to defect because they earn only $12 per month 
and they realize the significant financial assistance they can provide for their families if they 
defect.  However, Urrutia said that was never something he never considered because his 
family was always happy.  In fact, up to 2010, Urrutia’s career goal was to achieve the level 
of success in Cuba that his father and cousin did, hoping especially to contribute to the 
Cuban national team as they did.  But his attitude changed when he was not selected to 
participate in training with the national squad in 2009 and again in 2010 despite maintaining 
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one of the better batting averages in the country, and he was compelled to begin preparing 
for defection by September 2010. 
Urrutia’s motivation for defecting because of feelings he was being undervalued by 
the Cuban baseball system is a sentiment that has been echoed by other recent baseball 
defectors, including Yoenis Céspedes (Slusser and Bulwa, 2013), Yasiel Puig (Katz 2014), 
and a ballplayer given the pseudonym “Carlos Entrada” (Carter 2011a, 181).  To better 
understand this motivation we must remember that Cuban ballplayers of this caliber are fully 
aware of the shortcomings of the Cuban baseball system—they especially see the stark 
contrasts in lifestyles between them and others when they participate in international 
competition.  Moreover, they know that MLB offers the best baseball competition in the 
world and that many prior defectors have achieved great success, both financially and as 
ballplayers.  If a ballplayer’s sole motivation for remaining in Cuba is to compete at the 
highest levels at all times, but they feel that opportunity is unjustly denied to them, then 
professionally (and personally) speaking, the arguments for defection begin to outweigh 
those for them to remain in Cuba. 
It remains unclear how government officials discovered his plan23, but soon after 
Urrutia began planning to defect from Cuba, he was suspended from all baseball activities 
for one year.  His suspension from baseball mirrors other experiences discussed prior, such 
as that of Orlando “El Duque” Hernández, Germán Mesa, Eduardo Paret, Osmani García, 
and Angel López, and provides us with yet another example of the government exercising 
                                                
23 In our interview, Urrutia stated he began planning his defection in September 2010 
after he participated in and returned from the World University Baseball Championship in 
Japan the month prior.  In another interview, the translator/narrator said that Urrutia 
attempted to defect while in Japan for the World University tournament (Hoffmeister 2013). 
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“preventative punishment” to try to dissuade a ballplayer from defecting.  However, like 
these other instances, Urrutia’s resolve to successfully defect from Cuba was only 
strengthened by his suspension. 
When I questioned him about what concerns he had when deciding whether to 
defect, Urrutia stated his only concern was in regards to the illegality of his migration, 
noting, “the only thing that worried me was what could happen . . . to me in my country.”  
For these same reasons, he said he avoided telling anyone, except for his mother24 about his 
plans to defect.  “I really talked with absolutely nobody about this decision . . . because it is 
a decision that one cannot talk openly about in my country.”  In both these statements, we 
see the central role that illegality plays in baseball defection.  Urrutia’s concerns neither 
focused on the separation from his family or country, nor on the potentially dangerous 
journey he would have to undertake to accomplish his defection.  His only concern was 
about the illegality of his action and his desire to avoid punishment. 
Further encouraging Urrutia in his efforts to defect was his certitude that multiple 
agents and teams were interested in signing him if he ever left Cuba.  Since 2009, he had 
received multiple propositions had been made to him to defect by buscones25 on the island.  
From what Urrutia recalls, his successful defection from Cuba began on September 4, 2011.  
In order to accomplish it, he notes he did not have to consult with anybody about how to 
defect.  “I never asked or talked to anyone, I did not have to ask anything . . . I never had to 
                                                
24 “[T]he only person that I talked to was my mother because she is very close to me, 
you know, to avoid health problems caused by depression over this.  I decided to tell her but 
I did not tell my father or my brother. I did not talk to absolutely anyone.” 
 
25 Illegal scouts prevalent throughout Cuba who, typically under the employ of criminal 
smuggling networks, secretly recruit ballplayers to defect in order to profit off them through 
smuggling fees and/or by auctioning them off to baseball agents once abroad. 
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stop and ask at any moment, ‘What will happen?’ ‘What will it be like?’ ‘What do I have to 
do?’”  It is certainly possible that Urrutia may have received assistance in defecting from 
Cuba, yet he does not want to provide details about who helped him out of concern of 
jeopardizing their wellbeing, their operations, or even due to the potential he could face 
reprisal from them if he divulges too much.  However, taking him at his word, the ease with 
which Urrutia was able to arrange a defection from the island points to the widespread and 
accessible network human smugglers have established in Cuba that have enabled an 
increasing number of ballplayers to leave each year.   
Urrutia describes his defection trip as “one of the most difficult times of [his] life.”  
Before his departure from the island, he and several others, none of whom were baseball 
defectors, had to remain hidden for more than ten days as they all tried to get closer to the 
Holguín coast to rendezvous with a boat that could take them off the island.  During these 
days, he says, everyone in the group struggled, as they were forced to subsist without 
adequate provisions or any semblance of suitable living conditions.  After they were able to 
finally depart the island by boat en route to the Dominican Republic, they faced more dire 
conditions after their boat broke down and forced them to spend the next 3 days at sea 
without food or water, waiting for help to get them the rest of the way to the Dominican 
Republic.  Left without legal migration options, Urrutia’s departure required that he travel 
both lightly—that is to say, with nothing more than a few canned food items—to maintain 
his mobility, and in an unreliable vessel that left him stranded at sea.  Thus, we see that his 
defection, like the majority of those discussed in this examination, involved several 
instances when his physical safety was at extreme risk.  Urrutia’s defection route is also 
worth noting, as it involves the use of the now-conventional plan made famous by Joe Cubas 
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in the 1990s in which a ballplayer’s “point of arrival” is anywhere but the United States.  By 
taking this route, Urrutia was able to exploit his “flexible citizenship” as a transnational 
sport migrant and avoid any limitations to his initial MLB contract. 
Upon arriving in the Dominican Republic, Urrutia quickly connected with Cuban 
trainers on the island and, within a week, signed a six-year contract with the Baltimore 
Orioles worth $800,00026.  Although one would think that since Urrutia had arrived in the 
Dominican Republic and signed with an MLB team, his troubles would be over, this was not 
the case.  In an interview Urrutia gave a week after his arrival in the Dominican Republic, he 
stated that he planned to establish residency in that country within a week’s time 
(Hoffmeister 2013).  However, in our interview he related, “In the Dominican we could not 
get residency because they deceived us—they asked us for money, we [paid and] lost that 
money, and they did not give us residency.”  Setting aside the specific reasons for the delay, 
as a result of his difficulties with the Dominican migration and residency systems, Urrutia 
spent the next ten months in the Dominican Republic indefinitely awaiting a resolution.  As 
we have seen in other cases, the significant delay Urrutia endured while trying to establish 
legal residency is not unique—Rolando Arrojo, Andy Morales, and Yuniesky Betancourt are 
just a few of many other examples.  Its frequent occurrence is not difficult to comprehend 
either considering the assorted circumventions of legal migration routes that baseball 
defectors must undertake in the course of their defections. 
                                                
26 The rapidity with which Urrutia signed with the Orioles for nearly $1 million 
demonstrates that the Orioles had scouted him before, in anticipation of his defection.  Thus, 
their (and other organizations’) willingness to invest resources to scout Cuban ballplayers 
reveals not just their level of interest in Cuban baseball talent, but also their expectation that 
many will defect. 
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To obtain legal residency outside of the United States, Urrutia, along with various 
other baseball defectors who were unable establish residency, decided to circumvent the 
migration system once again by leaving the Dominican Republic and crossing into Haiti by 
car.  In this second circumvention, we see Urrutia employing his “flexible citizenship” as a 
transnational sport migrant again, yet this time to a degree that had not been previously 
considered.  By choosing to leave the Dominican Republic and crossing into Haiti, Urrutia 
utilized the added mobility afforded to him as an athlete and effectively bypassed one 
country’s migration system for another’s because the other’s was not working in his favor.  
Though it took another six months, Urrutia was ultimately granted residency in Haiti and he 
completed his migration to the United States soon thereafter. 
Urrutia notes he is the only one in his family who has emigrated from Cuba and, as 
far as he is aware, he is the only one who ever has desired to do so.  Surprisingly, he related 
that while he was in Haiti, the Cuban government permitted his father to visit him for one 
month.  This consent from the government is surprising for a number of reasons.  First, the 
eased exit visa guidelines that have permitted many Cubans to travel abroad in recent 
months were not yet implemented.  Second, the government has displayed a consistent track 
record of limiting the mobility of baseball defectors’ families after a defection.  And third, 
the government would have been fully aware of the fact that Urrutia was establishing 
residency in Haiti at that time.  Given these factors, it remains unclear how to interpret 
Urrutia’s father’s visit in the larger context of the Cuban government’s treatment of baseball 
defectors and their families, especially since Urrutia’s father maintains such good standing 
with Cuban authorities as evidenced by his recent renewal as a Serie Nacional baseball 
manager.  Perhaps it was their attempt to use Urrutia’s father to convince him to return to 
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Cuba—though Urrutia notes his father never tried to convince him of this27.  On the other 
hand, perhaps it demonstrates a less hard-nosed attitude the government is beginning to take 
with defectors and their families. 
Supporting the latter suggestion, Urrutia notes that after he defected “absolutely 
nothing” happened to his family.  There was no investigation, no interrogations, nobody was 
detained and, to his knowledge, his family has not faced any serious repercussions.  He said 
his family’s life continued normally—his mother has kept working her same job, his father 
has maintained his position as the head coach of the Las Tunas baseball team, and his 
brother has continued studying in university and playing baseball—and that he feels many 
people “somewhat exaggerate the things that happen in Cuba.”  The only possible 
consequence of his defection that he mentioned—though he is quick to point out this is just 
a matter of his own opinion—is that it may have hindered his brother’s opportunities to 
compete at the highest possible level in the Cuban baseball system.  Urrutia stated, “After I 
left, he had two opportunities and they did not put him on the team.  We think that this is 
because I came here, but it is something that we will never be able to prove because they can 
rebut ‘We did not put him on the team because he did not perform well enough.’” It is true it 
would be difficult to prove these claims especially since his brother made a Serie Nacional 
roster for the first time in his career this past season.   However, if the Cuban government 
has in fact kept his brother from competing at higher levels because it would entail he travel 
                                                
27 “My father—I cannot lie to you—he did not support [my defection] because he does 
not want to be separated from me, he did not support me because of the ideals he has, but he 
always respected me.” 
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abroad for competition28, then it would demonstrate the government’s continued practice of 
limiting ballplayers’ mobility so as to prevent potential defections. 
When asked about the contact he has had with his family since arriving in the United 
States, Urrutia alluded to many of the same difficulties that several other defectors have 
mentioned prior: 
I have actually not seen my family for two years . . . there is family I have not 
spoken to for a year.  With my mother, I have been able to speak to her by telephone 
two or three times per week, but I have not been able to see her by video.  It is very 
difficult. . . . [W]e do not have the internet technology [for video communications]—
the government has limited internet. . . . I cannot see my mother by video camera, I 
cannot see her through Facebook chat, or anything else.  She can write me through 
email and I can write her and [talk to her] over the telephone. 
It is clear in these statements that Urrutia and his family are experiencing the 
difficulties that come with forced separation in baseball defection.  Though he regularly 
communicates with them by telephone and email, he regards their ability to connect through 
these means as lacking and would undoubtedly prefer to be able to at least see them.     
Also, as many other defectors and their families have reported, Urrutia strongly 
believes the government is monitoring his communications with his family in Cuba. “Yes, 
there is [supervision]—there always is. . . . Disgracefully, that is the way it is.  They screen 
telephone calls.  They screen emails.  They monitor it all.”  Despite this supervision, though, 
Urrutia says he is not worried, because, “when [he] talks to [his] family, it is to know how 
they are doing.”  Further stating, “What I talk about or say in an email or phone call, it does 
not bother me if [the government] hears it because I do not say anything bad.” 
Like most other defectors, Urrutia stated that he sends his family packages 
containing money, clothes, or whatever else they may need.  Although he stated his family 
                                                
28 His name has not appeared on the roster of any baseball team that has travelled abroad 
for competition in the past two years. 
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has always been comfortable in Cuba, he feels he has been able to improve their standard of 
living some with the things he sends them.  He also noted that, in contrast to the monitoring 
of his communications, he does not believe the government has ever tampered with the 
packages he sends his family because everything he has sent has always arrived.  Yet, at the 
same time, he knows that other people have had items seized from packages they sent to 
their families in Cuba. 
In the near future Urrutia hopes his family will visit him in the United States and 
notes that his mother has specifically expressed her desire to do so.  Again, because Cuban 
law does not permit him to travel to Cuba until eight years after his defection, he has no 
hope of returning to his country to visit them until 2019.  He did not indicate whether 
anyone in his family has applied for an exit visa to visit him in the United States under the 
new guidelines, but given his family’s visibility and good standing in Cuba, this is 
something that should continue to be monitored because their situation would present a good 
test as to whether the Cuban government is easing its control over the mobility of a 
defector’s family.   
In regards to his brother’s future, he stated that his brother has never mentioned any 
interest in defecting, but at the same time, Urrutia did not rule out the possibility that his 
brother may attempt to do so someday.  “I advise him as much as I can but I have never 
asked him if he wants to come here to play or if he wants to come here to live. . . . It is a 
decision only he can make and I think, knowing my brother, that when he feels the need to 
come to this country, he will tell me then.”  Keeping in mind the Urrutia baseball legacy, 
including Henry’s father’s and cousin’s dedication to the Cuban baseball system throughout 
the defection era, if his brother does decide to defect it could indicate a significant 
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generational shift in attitudes towards baseball defection not just within their family, but in 
the country as a whole. 
Along these lines, Urrutia expressed his belief that the baseball system in Cuba is in 
an era of change especially in regards to its attitudes towards professionalism, referring 
specifically to the permission the government is now giving to ballplayers who desire to 
play professionally abroad.  Furthermore, while he is not certain that baseball can be a tool 
for change in US-Cuban relations today, he is hopeful that it can be in the future given our 
nations’ mutual passion for the sport and the changes he is seeing in the Cuban baseball 
system.  “I think that, with God, it can [help]. . . . I think that one day we will be able to try 
[baseball diplomacy] again, and that is a beautiful thing.”  He concluded our interview with 
the following: 
It is good for people, teachers, all those who listen, who watch, who want to know, to 
learn as much as they can about [Cuban baseball], about these [baseball defectors]—
[that is why] whatever you ask me, I answer the best that I can. . . . I hope, truly, that 
this helps. 
C. Thoughts on the Current State of Baseball Defection 
Considering Urrutia’s defection experience along with those discussed previously, it 
does appear that we are in the midst of an era of great change in the attitudes surrounding 
baseball defection in Cuba.  Unquestionably, illegality remains at the fore of the situation 
and continues to compel defectors and their families to undertake actions that entail severe 
legal and physical safety risks.  Furthermore, some continue to report troubling experiences 
that may even constitute human rights violations, such as limitations to their mobility and 
illegal detention.  Nevertheless, the Cuban government appears to have accepted that they 
are incapable of stopping baseball defectors and, as Urrutia mentioned, are making many 
more compromises to placate those who may be unsatisfied with only having the Cuban 
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baseball system available to them.  In addition to allowing ballplayers to participate in 
professional leagues around Latin America and Asia, the Cuban government took the 
unprecedented action of granting a young shortstop, Yoan Moncada, permission to legally 
leave Cuba for the stated purpose of pursuing a career in MLB (Sanchez 2014).  It is too 
soon to speculate what this surprising action will mean for the future of baseball defection 
and the Cuban baseball system, but what is undeniable is that it represents yet another 
marked change in attitude and policy towards baseball defection within Cuba that was 
previously unfathomable.   
Ultimately, given the limitations of both the prior accounts discussed and the case 
study presented here in providing us with a sufficient representation of Cuban baseball 
defection, it is clear that what is desperately needed now are many more close examinations 
of baseball defection experiences.  Knowing the little that we do about these experiences, it 
is untenable for us to continue to accept the “rags to riches” narrative that has become 
commonplace over the past two decades.  Moreover, it is equally unacceptable that those 
concerned with social justice continue to permit the circumstances that allow for these 
experiences to occur.  As such, improved knowledge about these experiences will help 
generate more widespread awareness of them, but we must also strive to uncover whatever 
avenues there may be to overcome world injustice. 
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Chapter 3 
Runners in Scoring Position: Baseball Diplomacy’s Past and Its Potential Future 
Bearing in mind the injustices prevalent in Cuban baseball defection experience 
discussed in the previous chapter, in addition to the countless others who have endured 
traumatic and difficult times due to the embittered relationship between the United States 
and Cuba over the past five decades, it is imperative that we continue to explore and 
reevaluate any plan that has the potential to advance our stalemated dialogue.  One idea that 
has repeatedly arisen throughout the years is to use cultural exchanges, including baseball, to 
build empathy between our nations in the hope that it will create enough popular support for 
restarting our relations.  Given the power of popular culture to effect political and societal 
change, exchanges of these kind certainly warrant reconsideration. 
“Baseball diplomacy” has become the term most commonly associated with attempts 
at improving US-Cuban relations through their shared national pastime, baseball (Carter 
1999; Carter and Sugden 2012; Elias 2011; Greller 1999; Turner 2010).  Unfortunately, all 
efforts to reestablish normalized ties through this form of cultural exchange—or any others 
for that matter—have been unsuccessful thus far.  Nevertheless, scholars, journalists, and 
politicians alike have been encouraged to explore the prospects baseball diplomacy may 
offer due to the prior success of sport diplomacy in restarting US-Sino relations, as well as 
the ever-evolving political and economic circumstances that exist both within and between 
the United States and Cuba (Cwiertney 2000; Frankel 2005; Greller 1999; Kornbluh 1999; 
Noyes 2004; Schneider 2001; Solomon 2011; Turner 2010; United States 1999).  In this 
chapter, I will consider past attempts at baseball diplomacy, assess why “Ping-Pong 
diplomacy” was successful at improving US-Sino relations in the 1970s and how that relates 
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to US-Cuba relations, and examine the role baseball diplomacy might play in helping to 
improve US-Cuban relations given the current socio-political situation. 
A. Baseball Diplomacy through the Years 
In the midst of the Cold War, the United States grew concerned and eventually 
angered with Fidel Castro’s newly formed Cuban government.  This animosity arose from 
Cuba’s enactment of numerous socialist and communist policies, resulting in the 
appropriation of large amounts of property owned by private US interests in the early 1960s.  
As time passed, diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba only worsened and 
ultimately led President John F. Kennedy to prohibit all economic exchange with Cuba.  
Since that time, there have been numerous attempts to repair US-Cuban ties (Bernell 2011; 
Castro Mariño and Pruessen 2012; Erikson 2011; Gibbs 2011), and among these diverse 
efforts, baseball diplomacy has repeatedly surfaced as a viable option (Bjarkman 2007; 
Carter 1999; Carter and Sugden 2012; Elias 2010; Turner 2010).  This would especially 
become the case following the success of “Ping-Pong diplomacy in 1971.”29  As such, there 
is a long history of politicians and those involved with MLB advocating for baseball 
diplomacy to pave the way for renewed US-Cuban relations. 
In 1971, just one month after the success of “Ping-Pong diplomacy,” San Diego 
Padres manager Preston Gómez, a Cuban native, attempted to organize a tour of Cuba with 
an all-star team of Cubans playing in MLB.  Gómez hoped to achieve a similar outcome to 
that which was seen between the US and China and had even reportedly garnered the 
                                                
29 In April 1971, members of the US Table Tennis team played a series of exhibition 
games against their Chinese counterpart in Mainland China. These games, dubbed “Ping-
Pong diplomacy,” are widely credited with reigniting US-Sino relations.  More about this 
event and its relation to baseball diplomacy will be discussed in the next section. 
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support of MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn (“Ball Stars’ Tour of Cuba Is Sought” 1971).  
Unfortunately, Gómez never received an endorsement from the US State Department, then 
headed by William Rogers, Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State, and thus Gomez’s goodwill 
mission never materialized (Jamail 2000, 123; Turner 2010, 69). 
A second attempt at baseball diplomacy arose in January 1975 with a similar cast 
when Kuhn and Gómez began discussing the possibility of arranging a series of games 
between Cuban and American baseball teams in Cuba with the director of the Instituto 
Nacional de Educación Física y Recreación (INDER), Cuba’s national sports agency.  
Encouraging Kuhn in his efforts even more was the fact that during a conversation he had 
with then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger just one month prior, Kissinger appeared 
open to this type of exchange with Cuba (“Letter from Bowie K. Kuhn to Henry Kissinger” 
1975).  Feeling optimistic about his chances of succeeding this time, Kuhn continued 
meeting with INDER officials in Mexico City and began seeking Kissinger’s formal 
approval to arrange the games.  However, despite Kissinger’s initial willingness to consider 
the baseball diplomacy series and the support given to it by his own aides (ironically 
including Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs as well as former Secretary of State 
William Rogers), by February 1975 Kissinger disapproved of plans to move forward with 
the series “at [that] time” (“Response to ‘Baseball Team to Cuba” 1975).  After, Kuhn and 
others alleged Kissinger would not allow the series to move forward because he was “angry 
at Cuba for sending troops to fight U.S.-backed right-wing forces in Angola” and also did 
not want to allow the Castro government to win favor with Americans (Elias 2010, 236). 
With Kissinger no longer serving as Secretary of State following the inauguration of 
Jimmy Carter’s administration in 1977, the State Department began urging Kuhn to reopen a 
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dialogue with his Cuban counterparts about a baseball diplomacy series.  Despite this, the 
efforts did not advance any further than its antecedents and Kuhn yet again blamed Cuban 
officials and the State Department for the failure.  In this instance, though, it was Kuhn who 
halted the discussions because of his publicly acknowledged annoyance with Cuba’s 
steadfast policy to prevent its ballplayers from signing with MLB organizations—an 
annoyance that developed into full-fledged “anticommunist and anti-Cuban sentiments” 
(Elias 2010, 236).  Fully resolute in his anti-Cuba stance, this attempt in 1977 marked the 
last time Bowie Kuhn was directly involved in baseball diplomacy negotiations, though it 
would not be the last time he had an impact on them.   
Still hoping baseball could resurrect diplomatic relations with Cuba, President Carter 
and his State Department arranged for the general manager of the Cleveland Indians, Gabe 
Paul, to directly negotiate with Cuban officials in 1978.  While this effort initially appeared 
promising, negotiations again broke down.  This time the cause was Fidel Castro feeling 
insulted on two separate occasions.  The first perceived insult occurred when American 
sports broadcaster Howard Cosell was forced to prematurely end an interview with Castro 
during the 1980 Winter Olympics so the network could return to coverage of speed skating 
(Elias 2010, 236).  The second and much more blatant insult resulted from comments made 
by Bowie Kuhn that his “principle [sic] incentive” in arranging games between US and 
Cuban teams was “to facilitate the availability of star Cuban players to American baseball” 
(Elias 2010, 237).  While it may not appear to be an insult on its surface, this statement 
deeply offended Castro because the basic tenet of the “revolutionary baseball” system he 
established on the island rejected any professionalism in sport; moreover, Cuban athletes—
especially baseball players—were considered embodiments of the revolution (Carter 2008b, 
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169).  With Kuhn asserting that he wanted to arrange exhibition games between the two 
nations mainly to lure these top symbols of the Cuban Revolution away from the island, he 
was in essence attacking the revolution itself.  Following these two failed efforts, Carter’s 
optimism for moving forward with baseball diplomacy was quashed and no more attempts 
were undertaken during the remainder of his presidency.  In fact, another effort was not 
made in earnest for approximately twenty years, due to the continued prevalence of Cold 
War politics through the 1980s and the emergence of high-profile Cuban baseball defections 
in the early-1990s. 
Analyzing the failure of baseball diplomacy in the 1970s, it appears that Cold War 
politics were partly to blame.  Throughout the decade, the Florida-based anti-Castro lobby, 
which has maintained sway in Washington since the 1959 revolution, made any politician’s 
move to mend relations a political risk.  In 1971, the State Department’s lack of interest in a 
baseball diplomacy series can be traced to the Nixon Administration having no real intent in 
normalizing relations with Cuba (Gibbs 2011, 19).  In the mid-1970s, Cuba’s involvement in 
the anticolonial conflict in Angola discouraged Kissinger under the Ford Administration 
from permitting exhibition games (Gibbs 2011, 19; López-Oceguera 2012, 233).   
In the late-1970s, the blame can be placed on Bowie Kuhn, a fact that is ironic 
considering that it was Kuhn who was initially the driving force behind baseball diplomacy 
and was even characterized by William Rogers as “[wanting] to be the ping-pong diplomat 
of Cuba” (Elias 2010, 236).  During these years, Kuhn became the primary reason the Carter 
administration’s attempts were undermined.  Indeed, his transparent motivations for 
promoting baseball diplomacy with Cuba solely as a means to access Cuban baseball labor 
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and increase revenues for his league ultimately killed some of the most promising 
opportunities that arose. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s several MLB clubs, including the Seattle Mariners, 
Milwaukee Brewers, Texas Rangers, California Angels (now known as the Los Angeles 
Angels of Anaheim), and Baltimore Orioles, inquired about playing exhibition games 
against a Cuban squad (Jamail 2000, 125-126).  However, not until 1999 would any of these 
efforts pay off, as Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos was granted the opportunity to 
arrange for his team to travel to Cuba for a preseason exhibition game on March 28—
marking the first time in forty years an MLB team played in Cuba.  Additionally, he was 
allowed to host the Cuban national team for an exhibition game at Camden Yards in 
Baltimore on April 3 (Jamail 2000, 143).  Despite the anticipated criticisms and political 
protests—including a protestor who ran onto the diamond during the game in Baltimore—
the exhibitions ensued without incident and received widespread media coverage.   
Since those games, there has been widespread and often varied speculation regarding 
the Clinton and Castro administrations’ political motivations for moving forward with these 
exhibitions (Bjarkman 2007, 411-412; Carter 1999, 581-582; Carter and Sugden 2012, 115; 
Elias 2010, 239; Jamail 2000, 142).  What is undisputed, though, is that regardless of the 
widespread hope that preceded the exhibitions, the games failed to produce any meaningful 
or lasting changes in US-Cuban relations. 
The reasons for the failure of the 1999 exhibition games to bring an end to the 
diplomatic standoff between the United States and Cuba have been examined extensively.  
In the very same year that the exhibitions took place, sport anthropologist Thomas Carter 
(1999) noted that the games “did not constitute a diplomatic exchange but rather a cultural 
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one that lacked the direct involvement of the two nation states.  Instead, there was a state-
sponsored Cuban team playing against a professional Baltimore team with no state ties” 
(Carter 1999, 581).  Milton Jamail wrote in 2000 that “there [were] no indications that either 
side softened their hard-line positions or that either the United States or Cuba care[d] about 
an immediate change in the relationship” (Jamail 2000, 149).   
Historian Robert Elias (2010) examined the reasons for failure in a larger political 
context and ultimately blamed the continuation of US-Cuban tensions on two incidents.  He 
notes that the Elián González affair, which occurred approximately one year after the 
exhibitions, undermined any goodwill created by the ballgames30.  Secondly, and much 
more importantly, he cites the aftereffects of 9/11, which shifted all American foreign policy 
attention towards matters of terrorism and security—including a drastic tightening of its 
borders—thereby relegating any efforts at conciliation with Cuba to the bottom of its 
priority list (Elias 2010, 240).  In short, although there were noteworthy incidents that 
damaged the chances for diplomatic reconciliation in the years following the exhibition 
games, the principal hindrance was that that neither side entered into the arrangement with 
any explicit intent to improve relations with the other.  When a fundamental change did not 
occur, neither nation felt disappointed or betrayed.  In the end, the exhibitions were nothing 
more than spectacles for the fans that provided Selig an opportunity to gain positive 
publicity for MLB and Castro an opportunity to grandstand before his entire nation. 
B. The Example of Ping-Pong Diplomacy 
                                                
30 See Gibbs (2011, 109-112) for more regarding the political circumstances surrounding 
the Elián González affair. 
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The United States terminated all formal diplomatic relations with the newly formed 
communist Chinese government when, in 1949, Mao Zedong’s Red Army defeated the 
Nationalist Chinese army after a prolonged civil war.  From that point on, US-Sino relations 
remained in a stalemate due to Cold War politics that recognized the national government in 
Taiwan as the only true Chinese government.  A break in the stalemate came when members 
of the United States national table tennis team were in Japan for the World Table Tennis 
Championships in 1971 and they accepted an invitation to play a set of exhibition games 
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China.  This invitation and the 
ensuing matches began what would be referred to as “Ping-Pong diplomacy” and is 
generally recognized as the moment when US-Sino tensions were eased, allowing for the 
resumption of formal diplomatic dealings.  Thus, when considering the potential for baseball 
diplomacy to improve US-Cuban relations, one cannot overlook the big historical precedent 
of sport diplomacy set in the early 1970s. 
To better understand the success of Ping-Pong diplomacy, it is first necessary to 
examine the circumstances that preceded it.  For some years prior to the 1971 World Table 
Tennis Championships in Japan, where arrangements for the “Ping-Pong diplomacy” 
exhibition games would take place, frictions between the Soviet Union and PRC had been 
growing (Carter and Sugden 2012, 103).  By 1969 the two nations, both of whom possessed 
a nuclear arsenal, were feared to be moving towards full-scale warfare (Carter and Sugden 
2012, 103).  Though the US ultimately hoped a “Sino-Soviet War” did not occur, it did see 
the hostilities as a chance for the PRC to “[identify] Russia as its sole antagonist, in contrast 
with the rest of the world and particularly with the United States” ("Sino-Soviet Hostilities 
and Implications for U.S. Policy" 1969).  In this way, the United States believed the PRC 
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would be more willing to collaborate with them and serve as a counterbalance to the USSR 
in the region.  Such was the case, as the communist Chinese government regarded the 
opportunity to improve ties with the United States as a chance to improve their military 
positioning against the Soviets with whom they shared a long border—through both 
technological and political support—as well as a chance to gain a new economic trading 
partner (Carter and Sugden 2012, 105). 
For those reasons, by the time the World Table Tennis Championships began in 
1971, the United States and PRC—both of which sent competitors to the tournament—were 
already open to dialogue, but likewise desired a “relatively risk-free pretext to explore the 
possibilities for closer political, economic and military relations” (Carter and Sugden 2012, 
104).  On April 4, 1971, when American team member Glenn Cowan began conversing with 
Chinese team member Zhuang Zedong on the Chinese team bus, the “relatively risk-free” 
situation the governments desired was presented to them.  While the specifics of how the 
invitation from the PRC to the US Table Tennis delegation in Japan transpired are uncertain, 
just ten days after Glenn Cowan and Zhuang Zedong’s conversation took place, Cowan and 
eight of his teammates (along with spouses, officials, and journalists) entered China to play 
a series of exhibition games and tour the country (Carter and Sugden 2012, 104).  By 
February 1972, following months of preparation, President Nixon arrived in Beijing to 
formally reestablish diplomatic associations with China. 
Analyzing the Ping-Pong diplomacy events that eventually led to the revival of US-
Sino cooperation, it becomes clear that both the United States and the PRC had a great deal 
to gain from the exchange.  As previously noted, communist China was at odds with the 
Soviet Union and needed to improve its capability to oppose the superpower to their north.  
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Moreover, China needed a respite from the US-imposed trade embargo that made economic 
development difficult to achieve.  For Nixon, in addition to the strategic advantage the 
United States would gain against the Soviet Union by allying more closely with China, he 
hoped better relations with China would help bring an end to the Vietnam War, which was 
highly unpopular in the US by 1972.  This latter aspiration was particularly important to 
Nixon given that he was slated to run for reelection against George McGovern, a staunch 
opponent to the Vietnam War.  Consequently, Nixon believed it was politically necessary to 
demonstrate to the American people that he was actively trying to bring the war to an end 
(Carter and Sugden 2012, 106). 
The circumstances surrounding the successful utilization of Ping-Pong diplomacy in 
the 1970s and the attempt at baseball diplomacy in the 1999 exhibition games between the 
Baltimore Orioles and Selección Cuba (the only baseball diplomacy attempt that ever 
materialized) show some noteworthy similarities despite their different outcomes.  This is 
true in the sense that both China and Cuba were communist states whose leaders—Mao 
Zedong in China and Fidel Castro in Cuba—maintained stable control over their respective 
nations.  Also, both Mao and Castro were regarded as the embodiments of all that anti-
communists within the United States opposed.  The mere participation of American 
politicians even in indirect dialogue with these two was politically risky.  At the same time, 
each situation presented an opportunity for Castro’s and Mao’s respective nations to be 
relieved of severe economic sanctions imposed through US embargos.  Finally, the United 
States stood to gain significant international favor if their relations with these governments 
were normalized. 
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Regardless of these similarities, the differences between the Chinese and Cuban 
situations ultimately had a greater impact on their outcomes.  First, there was no equivalent 
to the rising tensions seen between the Chinese and Soviet Union, which pressured Mao to 
seek a new political alliance in the United States.  Indeed, by 1999 the Cold War was over 
and Cuba had no comparable rivalries that compelled them to seek assistance from the 
United States.  Moreover, despite the fact that Cuba was in the midst of the “Special 
Period”31 and could have greatly benefited from a suspension of the US-imposed economic 
embargo, Castro likely calculated that he had more to gain from the propaganda he could 
generate by remaining steadfast in his opposition to the United States and using the 
exhibition games to promote béisbol revolucionario32 (Bjarkman 2007, 411-412).   
In late 2000 when President Clinton was serving out the final months of his second 
term, he was not facing the same kind of pressures to win favor with the American people as 
Nixon did while seeking reelection in 1972.  Nevertheless, if Clinton was perceived as 
advocating for improved relations with Castro’s government, he risked damaging Vice 
President Al Gore’s chances of winning the upcoming presidential election.  As a result, it 
was politically prudent for the Clinton Administration to proceed cautiously with Cuba in 
1999 in order to not upset the conservative Cuban-American communities in Florida and 
New Jersey (Jamail 2000, 142).  Lastly, whereas there was an obvious strategic advantage 
for the United States to gain by supporting China against the Soviet Union in the 1970s, no 
such prospect would have arisen by the United States starting a dialogue with Castro’s 
                                                
31 The “Special Period” refers to the economic depression in Cuba that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  It was characterized by famine and severe oil shortages. 
 
32 This refers to the amateur baseball system Castro established in 1961, which also 
brought an end to professional baseball in Cuba. 
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government in 1999.  Taking all this into account, it is clear that the political circumstances 
surrounding the sport exchange were not conducive to significant diplomatic progress. 
Symbolically, the baseball exhibition games did not carry nearly the same 
significance as was seen with “Ping-Pong diplomacy” either.  Thomas Carter (1999) noted 
that, unlike the “Ping-Pong diplomacy” matches, the baseball diplomacy games were not 
contested between two national teams, but between an MLB team and team consisting of 
Cuban all-stars.  It is also important to note that the Baltimore Orioles did not have any 
ballplayers of Cuban descent on their roster or among their coaching staff, they were not one 
of the premier teams in MLB, and they in no way embody the United States to those outside 
the US in the same way that the New York Yankees organization arguably does (the word 
“yanqui” is used to refer to Americans in much of Latin America).  Furthermore, the timing 
of the exhibitions was not ideal for the members of the Orioles being that the arduous 162-
game MLB season began on April 5.  Their first matchup with Selección Cuba took place 
just before the start of the season, while the second was held after they had already played 
24 regular season games.  Not surprisingly then, some questioned the effort that would be 
put forth by the Orioles ballplayers—especially in the second exhibition—and noted that 
they seemed inconvenienced by the two games, rather than seeing US or even MLB pride at 
stake (Bjarkman 2007, 412; Jamail 2000, 147-148).  All things considered, Milton Jamail 
(2000) and Thomas Carter’s (1999) characterization of the 1999 exhibition games as an 
insincere attempt at baseball diplomacy is apt since neither the Baltimore Orioles, nor the 
leaders of either government were truly striving for success. 
C. The Political Environment and Baseball Diplomacy Today 
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As we have seen in the case of “Ping-Pong diplomacy,” sport can have the potential 
to serve as a form of “soft diplomacy” between rival nations.  That is to say, it allows for 
nations to indirectly negotiate with each other under the premise of a cultural exchange, 
rather than traditional channels, such as diplomats or top-level government officials.  
Generally, by pursuing improved relations via “soft diplomacy,” the pressure on each nation 
to find immediate solutions or compromise is lessened—even to the point that the exchange 
becomes “relatively risk-free” (Carter and Sugden 2012, 104)—because the primary public 
focus shifts to the lighthearted cultural event.  Instead of concentrating on serious diplomatic 
meetings with stern-faced officials, the spotlight is on a cheerful exchange among young and 
energetic athletes, enthusiastic about the opportunity to represent their nation in sport.  Sport 
diplomacy exchanges also have the potential to ease tension among the government leaders 
involved in the discussions, since they have an opportunity to “break the ice” with their 
counterpart over a shared pastime, in a relaxed setting.  Speaking specifically of the United 
States, Cuba, and baseball, the sport has a long and beloved history in each nation.  Even 
more than that, baseball is regarded as fundamental both to the American and the post-
revolutionary Cuban character.  It provides a clear cultural commonality that is ideal for 
sport diplomacy if the political will to engage in it is present. 
This is not to say that sport diplomacy is a panacea for international relations.  
Indeed, by considering the failed attempt at baseball diplomacy in 1999, one example in 
which sport diplomacy was ineffective has already been presented.  Nevertheless, “soft 
diplomacy” through sport can serve as a starting point and catalyst for renewed relations 
between two governments if the political circumstances are favorable and the lessons of 
history are heeded.   
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The next logical question then becomes, what are the ideal circumstances needed in 
order for a fundamental change in US-Cuban relations to transpire?  Daniel P. Erikson 
(2011) asserts “renewed interest” by American businesses will go a long way towards 
pressuring the US government to make changes.  Similarly, he notes that reforms to the 
Cuban economic structure can create more support for a new relationship.  Lastly, he argues 
the death of Fidel Castro and a shift to new political leadership can make the process of 
reconciliation between the two governments more likely (112).  Jessica F. Gibbs (2011) 
contends domestic politics in each nation is, and always has been, the primary force that has 
either moved the governments towards or away from improved relations (151).  Along the 
same lines, LeoGrande and Jiménez (2012) claim that a renewed effort to mend relations 
with Cuba will result from the “political capital and presidential mandate” that comes with 
President Obama’s reelection (371).  Taking these perspectives into account, there are 
various signs that the United States and Cuba may be ready to move beyond their Cold War 
era stances—something Obama called a move towards “a new beginning” (Lowenthal 2011, 
2)—and that sport diplomacy is especially suited to aid in that endeavor. 
The first indication that Cuba may be ready to move towards normalized diplomatic 
ties with the United States can be seen in its recent easing of travel restrictions.  Since the 
policies that previously restricted Cuban citizens from travelling abroad have been relaxed, 
many more Cubans have been permitted to travel outside of the island (“Travel from Cuba” 
2012).  In one of the more significant examples, Yoani Sánchez, a prominent dissident 
blogger, was granted a passport in 2013 in order to travel to several nations, including the 
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United States (Chávez 2013)33.  In addition, the Cuban government has eased laws 
prohibiting high-profile defectors from returning.  In the new policy, defectors who have 
been away from the island for at least 8 years can return without facing criminal 
prosecution.  This allowed José Contreras, one of the most prominent baseball defectors, to 
return to Cuba for the first time in a decade (Franks 2013).  Ultimately, these changes signal 
a deviation from the government’s stern attitude towards individuals it perceived as threats, 
which pervaded the past five decades.  Consider also that, with an impending visit from the 
pope, the Cuban government released approximately 3,000 political prisoners—known as 
“prisoners of conscience”—between 2010 and 2011 likely in an attempt to boost its profile 
as the eyes of the international community shifted to them (“Cuba to release nearly 3,000 
prisoners” 2011; Haven 2011; LeoGrande and Jiménez 2012, 370). 
In addition to changes in travel restrictions, the Cuban state has undertaken what 
some see as monumental economic reform and political reorganization in recent years.  
Attempting to improve the country’s stagnant financial state, the government has instituted 
changes to its economy that allow for increased private entrepreneurship and the ownership 
of private property (“Cuban economy to undergo changes after travel reform” 2012).  These 
changes demonstrate an historic shift in post-revolutionary economic policy since they insert 
more market economics into Cuba’s strongly socialistic system, and suggest to many that 
the government is open to exploring economic avenues that were previously unfathomable.  
This has many business people, especially in the United States, eager about the prospects of 
expanding their operations into Cuba, and has even caused some economic observers to 
                                                
33 Sánchez returned to Cuba after several months and, despite having criticized the 
policies of the Cuban government in public on several occasions during her trip, she has 
faced no known repercussions. 
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wonder if Cuba will become the next big emerging market in Latin America (van Sickle, 
2013).  If Cuba continues to open itself up to market economics, perhaps modeling itself 
after the Chinese system, we may see the American business sector increase pressure on the 
US government to expand cooperation with the Cuban government so they can do business 
on the island.   
Even more significant than the economic reforms, the end of the Castro brothers’ 
reign is in sight, as Raúl Castro announced he would not seek another term as President after 
his current tenure expires in 2018.  Looking towards Cuba’s political future, it becomes 
quickly apparent that the emerging leadership is much more open to the kind of reforms 
already enacted.  In fact, this new generation of party leaders, led by Miguel Díaz-Canel, the 
current Vice President and apparent successor to Raúl Castro, is credited with inducing the 
recent moves towards economic liberalization on the island (“Cuba’s leaders” 2013; Tamayo 
2013).  Taking into consideration that the next generation of political leadership will be the 
first to not have fought in the 1959 revolution and, given their demonstrated willingness to 
restructure Cuba’s Cold War-era policies, it is not implausible to think they will continue to 
move Cuba away from the hardline positions of the 20th century once in power. 
Within the United States, President Obama made it easier for Americans to travel to 
Cuba through so-called “people to people exchanges.”  As a result, many more Americans 
have travelled to the island since 2009 (Bachelor 2011).  In 2012, the Cuban National 
Statistics Office reported that more than 98,000 Americans travelled to Cuba, about 25,000 
more than the previous year and double the amount of 2007 (Frank 2013).  The Obama 
Administration also reformed guidelines for the 1.5 million Cuban-Americans who have 
family living in Cuba.  Along with other changes, including the removal of a limit on the 
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dollar amount Cuban-Americans can send to their relatives on the island, the administration 
now permits unlimited travel to Cuba for those with family ties there (Silva and Wilkinson 
2009).  While the idea of normalizing relations with Cuba has been routinely proffered by 
each administration since the enactment of the embargo, actions that reflect a true 
willingness to improve relations have rarely accompanied the rhetoric.  However, Obama’s 
decisions regarding travel policies represent a change in this trend and suggest his 
administration is much more willing than his predecessors to enhance cooperation with the 
Cuban government. 
In further consideration of current US domestic politics, the sway of the radical 
Cuban-American population that heretofore fervently opposed any change in US-Cuban 
relations has substantially diminished.  In the 2008 presidential election, Obama received 
only 35 percent of the Cuban-American vote in Florida—a percentage that ranks highly 
among Democratic presidential candidates—yet still won the state’s 27 electoral votes.  
Even more telling is the fact that 55 percent of Cuban-Americans under the age of 30 voted 
for Obama.  Clearly a generational shift has occurred in the state (Erikson 2011, 102).  
Furthermore, despite having pursued the changes in policies towards Cuba, Obama 
improved on his 2008 election result in 2012 when he received 49 percent of the Cuban-
American vote (Lopez and Taylor 2012) and 60 percent of the vote from Cubans born in the 
US34 (Campo-Flores 2012).  Having won reelection, Obama is now serving the final years of 
his presidency and is no longer burdened with having to win reelection himself.  In light of 
this, as well as the encouraging shifts in Florida voter trends, Obama is seemingly freer to 
                                                
34 While data specifically referring to Cuban-Americans under 30 could not be found for 
the 2012 presidential election, this demographic effectively represents the same population. 
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pursue a foreign policy initiative like improving diplomatic relations with Cuba, which 
would have been too politically risky before. 
Reappraising the criteria necessary for a fundamental shift in US-Cuban relations as 
established prior, it is evident the present circumstances are promising.  First, with the 
economic reforms already enacted in Cuba, and with more likely to come in the future, Cuba 
appears poised to insert itself more into the global market as a means of growing their 
economy.  This has piqued the interest of a number of business sectors in the United States 
and will likely place increasing pressure on American politicians to do away with any 
policies that prohibit American businesses from dealing within Cuba.  Second, while ex-
President Fidel Castro is not yet dead and his younger brother Raúl remains President, the 
next generation of political leadership has not only begun to form, but has already made a 
considerable impact on the island as seen through the previously mentioned economic 
reforms.  Third, a shift in domestic politics within Cuba is occurring and is giving rise to 
more moderate stances.  Recent economic reforms, as well as the easing on travel 
restrictions and the release of numerous political prisoners exemplify this.  Fourth, a shift in 
the United States’ domestic politics has also taken place.  This change is primarily 
represented by the diminishing influence of the anti-Castro lobby that made any attempt to 
improve relations with Cuba politically impossible throughout the 20th century.  In its place 
is a younger Cuban-American generation that was born in the United States and is not 
entirely opposed to reconciliation with Cuba.  In addition, through his rhetoric and limited 
actions towards Cuba—specifically the change in travel and financial remittance policies—
Barack Obama has conveyed a willingness to transform US-Cuban relations.  Thus, 
bolstered by the various economic and political changes taking place in Cuba, the 
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weakening domestic opposition to improved relations, and the fact that he is now serving out 
the waning years of his presidency, Obama should be poised to finally find the means by 
which he can thrust the United States and Cuba into a new era of diplomatic cooperation.  
With these factors in mind, MLB has the opportunity to utilize its status as a 
transnational organization to facilitate dialogue between the American and Cuban 
governments.  Even prior to Obama’s presidency, while the Bush Administration was 
making it nearly impossible to arrange for any cultural exchange with Cuba (LeoGrande and 
Jiménez 2012, 369), MLB exemplified its clout by convincing the government to allow 
Selección Cuba to travel to the United States for the newly established World Baseball 
Classic (WBC)—an international baseball tournament first hosted in 2006 that is akin to the 
World Cup in soccer.  Since then, and especially after Obama took office in 2009, the use of 
baseball as a means of cultural exchange between the two nations has become 
commonplace, albeit on a small and mostly unnoticed level.  Given this, MLB is well 
positioned to generate the kind of meaningful impact that can present Obama with an 
opportunity to begin a dialogue with Cuba that is aimed at reconciliation. 
The use of baseball as a diplomatic tool is not a novel idea; indeed, many have 
considered the avenues MLB could take in order to foster better collaboration between the 
United States and Cuba.  Some ideas that have been suggested are the institution of a 
worldwide draft, the sanctioning of unrestricted participation by Cuban ballplayers in MLB, 
and the promotion of the Baseball Diplomacy Act (also known as H.R. 187 and House Bill 
2311, “A Bill to Waive Certain Prohibitions With Respect to Nationals of Cuba Coming to 
the United States to Play Organized Baseball” 1999) (Cwiertney 2000; Frankel 2005; 
Greller 1999; Schneider 2001; Solomon 2011).  However, each of these proposals only seek 
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to generate loopholes that will create a legitimate process under the current system by which 
Cuban ballplayers can play in the United States, thereby eliminating the need for baseball 
defections.  While the aims are noble, none of these plans address the fundamental issue of 
US-Cuban relations.   
Given the present political situation, MLB and the leaders of each nation should have 
loftier ambitions, as each stands to benefit from improved diplomatic relations (Solomon 
2011, 183-185).  Cuba could gain a substantial economic trading partner in the United States 
and make significant strides towards resolving their economic woes as they move towards a 
new era in their nation’s history.  The United States could gain a new and potentially 
emerging market in Latin America, increase their prospects of bringing democracy to Cuba 
through increased interaction with the Cuban public, and win favor with Latin America as a 
whole—a region where the United States has historically struggled to maintain a positive 
reputation.  Lastly, as MLB has sought to globalize their operations and have especially 
focused on Latin America in these attempts, they could gain a new Latin American market 
comprised of a nation full of baseball fanatics, as well as many MLB-caliber ballplayers.  
Rachel D. Solomon also contends that MLB can motivate baseball diplomacy efforts by 
removing restrictions instituted under Bowie Kuhn—particularly the Kuhn Directive—
which were enacted as a way to prevent MLB from collaborating with the Cuban amateur 
league (Solomon 2011, 185-186).   
While Solomon makes reasonable proposals, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig and his 
successor35 could extend their objectives further by setting their sights on coordinating a 
baseball diplomacy series in collaboration with each nation’s leaders.  Already, Selig has 
                                                
35 Selig announced that the 2014 MLB baseball season will be his last as commissioner. 
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exhibited a willingness to use baseball for this purpose, as exemplified by his approval of 
the 1999 exhibition games between the Baltimore Orioles and Selección Cuba.  In order to 
succeed in these attempts, however, MLB should arrange for the contests to take place either 
between the two national squads or an equally symbolic pair of teams (i.e. New York 
Yankees and Industriales, the two most recognizable teams in each nation), plan an 
exhibition in each country, and announce the repeal of the Kuhn Directive.  Most 
importantly, under the premise of bringing the system of Cuban baseball defection out of the 
shadows and thus boosting its humanitarian record, MLB should ensure that representatives 
from the United States and Cuban governments accompany the teams.  Not only would the 
inclusion of government officials in these discussion allow MLB to find a more permanent 
solution to the issue of baseball defections and allow it to reap the other aforementioned 
benefits, but it would have the additional advantage of giving the US and Cuban 
governments a starting point for further cooperation. 
At this point in US-Cuban relations—more than fifty years since the Revolution and 
start of strained bilateral relations—the need for back-channel negotiation between the two 
governments is no longer politically necessary.  The Cold War has been over for more than 
two decades and the worldwide consensus is that a change in their relationship is long 
overdue.  As a result, the United States and Cuba can begin expressing their desires for 
improved relations in a more explicit manner, especially given the benefits each stands to 
gain if their relations were mended.  Taking into consideration the present circumstances in 
Cuban and American domestic and international politics, the figurative bases are loaded for 
a new era of cooperation between them.  Using baseball diplomacy, and an understanding of 
its history, the United States and Cuba can commence the process of diplomatic 
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normalization on a field of a mutually beloved pastime, celebrating their cultural 
commonality while moving beyond their political differences. 
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Conclusion 
It is early November, but in Phoenix, the 80-degree weather accompanied by a light 
breeze is ideal for Arizona Fall League baseball.  The crowd at Camelback Ranch Stadium 
is sparse and made up of mostly retirees and baseball scouts nearing retirement age, all of 
whom have come to watch a ballgame played by young men who are billed as “MLB’s 
future.”  Along the left field foul line of this immaculately manicured baseball field, Henry 
Urrutia stretches alone in preparation for a game against the Glendale Desert Dogs.  Just as 
he completes a few 90-foot sprints, the stadium public address announcer asks those in 
attendance to rise and remove their caps for the playing of the national anthem.  Urrutia jogs 
to the foul line to join his Surprise Saguaros teammates and stands alongside a fellow Cuban 
baseball defector.  They both know this routine well by now and stand with their arms 
casually placed behind their backs staring towards the American flag just beyond the wall in 
left-center field while a recorded orchestral version of “The Star Spangled Banner” plays.   
As they stand there together listening to the anthem of their adopted country, one 
cannot help but reflect on the circumstances that brought them to this place and point.  
Certainly, we have a greater understanding of the experience that Urrutia underwent in order 
to reach professional baseball, including the central role that illegality played in it.  We also 
know that his baseball defection experience, like many others, has been anything but a “rags 
to riches” story.  He and his family continue to be burdened by the forced separation that 
baseball defection entails.  Moreover, though the specific details of the second defector’s 
experience are unknown, we know that as a baseball defector he potentially experienced 
violations to his human rights in the form of unjust restrictions to his mobility, illegal 
detention, supervision of his communications, or perhaps even worse.  Also, we are much 
  73 
more familiar with the numerous legal and physical risks he had to first negotiate, and then 
assume in order to accomplish his defection.   
Unfortunately, given the lack of insight into family experiences in Cuban baseball 
defection, our understanding of the upshots of baseball defection especially for those left 
behind in Cuba remains severely lacking.  On this front, our charge is to seek more novel 
perspectives and to scrutinize these experiences in the manner of the Urrutia case study so 
that we can continually challenge our expectations and ultimately obtain a more nuanced 
and thorough understanding of these experiences.  
Our present understanding of the individual and combined familial experiences of 
Cuban baseball defection also compels us to identify paths through which we may begin to 
renew US-Cuban relations and bring an end to the need for baseball defections.  Given the 
current socio-political environment, as well as ability for sport to effect change, one way for 
us to fundamentally improve our relations with each other may be through baseball 
diplomacy.  As such, we should strive to hold each party—the United States, Cuba, and 
MLB—responsible for their part in creating and maintaining the circumstances that 
encourage baseball defections and implore them to seek improved relations.   
Ultimately, we cannot ignore the negative impact that strained US-Cuban relations has had 
not just on baseball defectors and their families, but on thousands of others with ties to either 
or both countries.  As a result, I contend that we must recognize that the obstinate stance each 
nation has maintained for the past fifty years is a relic of the Cold War era that has long since 
been without sufficient justification and that we are all morally obligated to end its prolonged 
application in order to increase social justice. 
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Appendix 1: List of Known Cuban Baseball Defectors 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
Negotiation of decision to defect: 
• What was life in Cuba like & what was life expected to be like in U.S. (hopes)? 
• Who consulted (incl. prior defectors, individuals in U.S.)? 
• What was considered (safety, will others follow to U.S., same decision w/o 
baseball)? What were the decisions about each consideration? Who decided? 
• When & how defection occurred (logistics & feelings)? 
• Were there any difficulties or obstacles in gaining entry to US or other countries? 
 
Life as a defector/results of defection (Cuba): 
• Who was left behind in Cuba and who is in U.S. now? 
• With whom do you remain in contact? 
• Any difficulties with communication? 
• What’s going on in Cuba w/family (incl. changes in life, community opinion)? 
• Government intervention in life (questioning, monitoring, seizure of property, benefits, 
work)? 
• Travel issues (their return to Cuba, family’s ability to move freely)? 
 
Life as a defector (U.S.): 
• How is life now? 
• Expectations of life vs. reality? 
• Who has helped adjustment to life here (former defectors, other Cubans, family)? 
• Hope for future (for self and family)? 
 
Opinion of defector issue as a whole: 
• Current state of Cuban baseball? 
• How are defectors regarded in Cuba? 
• What would you like to see happen in the future with this situation? Baseball 
diplomacy? 
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Appendix 3: Map of Cuba 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cuba (Political), 1994, University of Texas Libraries 
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Appendix 4: Map of Central America and The Caribbean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Political Map of Central America and The Caribbean, GeographicGuide.net 
